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SONY, TORT DOCTRINES, AND THE
PUZZLE OF PEER-TO-PEER
Alfred C. Yent
INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes and reconstructs the law of third party copy-
right liability' as it applies to providers of peer-to-peer technology.
By doing so, the Article accomplishes three things. First, it identifies
doctrinal tension between broad third party copyright liability en-
dorsed by lower courts and the Supreme Court's skepticism of such
liability as expressed in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal
City Studios.2 Second, it describes how existing interpretations of the
law fail to direct judicial attention to important considerations that
ought to influence the third party copyright liability of peer-to-peer
providers. Third, it uses concepts borrowed from common law torts
to improve the law by resolving doctrinal tension and directing judi-
cial attention to important considerations that are presently over-
looked.
An understanding of the peer-to-peer puzzle begins with Sony, a
case that is one of the most important in all of copyright law. Al-
though perhaps best known for declaring legal the practice of time-
shifting, Sony has also influenced the development and distribution of
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Article is a part. Thanks are also owed to David Petrini, Gerald Kazanjian, Jesse Cook-Dubin,
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The term "secondary copyright liability" is also sometimes used to describe the liability
analyzed in this Article.
2 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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technology through its holding that the Sony Corporation of America
("Sony") was not contributorily liable for selling video cassette re-
corders ("VCRs") to people who used those machines to commit
copyright infringement. Indeed, Sony is generally credited with mak-
ing it legal to sell photocopy machines, disk drives, software, and
other technology that can be used to commit copyright infringement.3
Sony ranks among the wisest copyright decisions ever rendered by
the Supreme Court, but it was also controversial. The final 5-4 mar-
gin emerged only after considerable debate and negotiation turned a
dissent by Justice Stevens into a majority,4 and it is easy to see why.
After all, Sony had made it possible for millions of people to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted works. The Court therefore had
to deal with the possibility that the movie industry might be seriously
harmed unless the court held Sony liable.5 Of course, hindsight is 20-
20, and it is now clear that society, including the movie industry, had
much to gain from the free availability of VCRs. Indeed, the sale of
movies on tape eventually outstripped the very theater sales the movie
industry sought to protect.6 Sony therefore created the ultimate "win-
win" situation. Consumers reaped the benefits of making millions of
free, unauthorized copies of copyrighted works, and the producers of
those works made even more money by exploiting the technology that
made all that copying possible.
One might imagine that hindsight has removed Sony from contro-
versy, and that the case now lends coherence to the law of third party
3 The copyright code reserves to copyright holders the right to reproduce the copyrighted
work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (2002). Accordingly, any technology that makes copies can be used
to commit infringement.
4 See Jonathan Band and Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind
the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1993); Jesse
M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. Of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the
Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 874-75 (2004); Lee A. Hollaar, Sony Revisited: A
New Look at Contributory Copyright Infringement, available at http://digital-law-
online.info/papers/lah/sony-revisited.htm, 4-5 (last updated Apr. 8, 2005).
5 See Home Truths for Hollywood, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 1983 at 72-73 (reporting
concern about effect of VCRs on the movie industry). The most colorful statement about possi-
ble harm to the movie industry was Jack Valenti's statement that "the VCR is to the American
film producer and the American public what the Boston strangler is to the woman alone." See
Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R.
5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (testimony of Jack
Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
6 See S. J. Diamond, Videotape Industry Schism - Sell or Rent, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
April 19, 1991, Business, Part D, p. 1 (reporting that sales of movies on videotape earned more
than theater sales by the end of the 1980's). In 2003, the sale of home video (both VHS tapes
and DVDs) accounted for approximately 60% of movie studio revenue. See Highlights of the
VSDA 's 2004 Annual Report on the Home Entertainment Industry, available at
http://www.vsda.org/Resource.phx/vsda/publications/2004annualreport/index.htx (last visited
March 26, 2005).
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copyright liability. However, this has not occurred. In fact, Sony is
actually a source of tension within copyright. Controversy exists be-
cause the very technological progress fostered by Sony has raised
fresh questions about whether it is desirable for society to tolerate
copyright infringement in order to gain the benefits of new technol-
ogy.
The recent debate over peer-to-peer technology offers an excellent
example of this controversy. Peer-to-peer technology is the latest,
and perhaps most powerful, method for empowering an Internet user
to offer and receive entire libraries of information at no cost. This
technology makes it very easy for individuals to share files on their
hard disks with other users of the same peer-to-peer network, and it
lets each user search for and download files from the others.7 In the-
ory, people could use peer-to-peer technology to distribute any kind
of computer file. In practice, however, people generally use it to
commit copyright infringement by swapping unauthorized copies of
copyrighted music and movies. The most popular networks support
millions of users simultaneously, so peer-to-peer technology supports
a great deal of infringement. Not surprisingly, many copyright hold-
ers believe that the infringement facilitated by peer-to-peer technol-
ogy poses an unacceptable threat to the security of copyright and, by
extension, the public interest. They believe that providers of peer-to-
peer technology should be held liable for their users' infringement,
and they have sued to back up their claims. 8
Both sides of these peer-to-peer suits have strong doctrinal and
policy arguments to support their positions. The plaintiffs can point
to a steady expansion of third party copyright liability that supports
liability against peer-to-peer providers. Such liability would control
technology before it reduces copyright's incentive to produce socially
valuable works. The defendants can respond by arguing that the
cases expanding third party copyright liability do not involve the
creation or distribution of technology, and that Sony prohibits liability
against any technology provider whose technology is capable of non-
infringing use. This reading of Sony makes sense because Sony
stands for the principle that copyright ought not stifle the develop-
ment of technology. If technology providers become responsible for
their users' misbehavior, they will stop developing and creating for
7 For descriptions of various peer-to-peer systems, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158-60 (9th Cir. 2004), certiorari granted, 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2003); A & M Re-
cords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001).
8 See Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Aimster, 334 F.3d 642; Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154.
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fear of liability, and this will ultimately rob society of the many bene-
fits that technology brings.
Not surprisingly, courts have found it difficult to choose between
the positions expressed above. Both sides have a point, and courts are
trying to strike a compromise that leaves appropriate room for the
development of technology while offering some protection against
unreasonable risks to copyright. Unfortunately, courts have found it
difficult to accomplish this task. As of this writing, three appellate
courts have issued conflicting opinions about the liability of peer-to-
peer providers, and the Supreme Court is about to weigh in on the
subject.9
The desired compromise has proven elusive because the existing
law of third party copyright liability does not effectively analyze facts
important to the liability of peer-to-peer providers. As an intuitive
matter, the third party copyright liability of any technology provider
ought to depend on two things. First, it matters why the defendant
created or distributed the technology. A defendant who creates tech-
nology and hopes that others will use it to infringe becomes culpable
in a way that strongly supports liability. By contrast, a defendant who
acts to facilitate noninfringing behavior is far less culpable if it turns
out that others deliberately misuse the defendant's technology to in-
fringe, and the case for his liability would be debatable.
Second, it matters what the social costs and benefits of a particular
technology are. Peer-to-peer technology obviously causes copyright
infringement, but there are social benefits associated with the tech-
nology as well. People can use peer-to-peer networks to distribute
copies of their own work, public domain works, and works they have
permission to distribute. Peer-to-peer networks are also relatively
easy to maintain and reliable because they frequently operate with
little reliance upon a central actor whose disruption will destroy the
network. These relative costs and benefits need to be measured, and
it is likely that they will vary with the design of particular peer-to-
peer systems. Liability makes more sense when the infringement
associated with a particular system seems large in relation to any an-
ticipated social benefits, and it makes less sense when the amount of
infringement seems small in relation to those benefits.
Unfortunately, the doctrinal elements that govern third party copy-
right liability do not direct judicial attention to these considerations.
Vicarious liability depends on a defendant's control over and finan-
cial interest in another's infringement, while contributory liability
9 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686, 160 L. Ed. 2d
518 (2004) (granting certiorari).
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depends on a defendant's knowledge of and contribution to another's
infringement. These elements may affect the desirability of third
party liability, but they do not get to the heart of the matter. Courts
will therefore find it almost impossible to construct an effective solu-
tion to the peer-to-peer puzzle without reconstructing the law of the
third party copyright liability.' 0
This Article will show that the application of common law tort
principles accomplishes the necessary reconstruction. In so doing, the
Article does not argue for a particular result in any particular case.
The point is simply to demonstrate that principles drawn from inten-
tional torts, negligence, respondeat superior, and strict products li-
ability do better than existing doctrine at accounting for the motiva-
tions of defendants and the social costs and benefits of peer-to-peer
technology. If courts were to use these principles to analyze peer-to-
peer cases, their analysis of peer-to-peer cases would become more
responsive to basic policy concerns and the wisdom of Sony. This
increases the likelihood of decisions that serve the greater public
good.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the major doc-
trines that govern third party copyright liability and studies their de-
velopment. This leads to a discussion of the tension between the ex-
pansion of such liability and the policies expressed in Sony. Part II
examines how courts have tried to apply these doctrines in three mod-
em peer-to-peer technology cases, A & M Records v. Napster, Inc,'1
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,'2 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.'3  The examination shows that judges
struggle in modern cases because existing doctrine does not effec-
tively analyze the facts courts consider most important in peer-to-peer
cases. Part HI uses the common law of tort to develop an improved
framework for third party copyright liability. The Article concludes
with some thoughts about the future of third party copyright liability
and the development of technology.
10 See infra Section 1. A. 1-2. This Article is not alone in arguing that courts have had dif-
ficulty solving the peer-to-peer puzzle, and that some attention to the relative costs and benefits
of peer-to-peer technology is desirable. See Tom Graves, Picking up the Pieces of Grokster: A
New Approach to File Sharing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 137, 160 (2004) (pointing out
difficulties in existing interpretations of vicarious and contributory copyright liability and advo-
cating the use of burden shifting and presumptions as part of a cost-benefit analysis); Feder, Is
Betamax Obsolete?, supra note 4, at 859 (expressing dissatisfaction with existing law and
proposing the comparison of social costs and benefits of technology); Elizabeth Miles, In re
Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 21 (2004) (noting problems in the application of Sony to peer-to-peer).
11 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
12 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
13 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), certiorari granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD PARTY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
A. The Expansion of Third Party Copyright Liability
Two doctrines-vicarious liability and contributory
liability-govern secondary liability in copyright. Although both of
these doctrines originated in tort law, courts have developed them
with little regard for limits on the reach of analogous doctrines in tort
law. This has led to the expansion of third party copyright liability.
1. Vicarious Copyright Liability
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. 14 provides the modern
definition of vicarious copyright liability.1 5  The Shapiro plaintiffs
sued two defendants for the unauthorized manufacture and sale of
bootleg records. The first defendant, Jalen Amusement Company,
made and sold the records in question. The second defendant, the
H.L. Green Company, operated a chain of 23 department stores in
which Jalen sold records as a licensed concessionaire. The claim
against Jalen was straightforward. The district court found that Jalen
had infringed and imposed liability.' 6  However, the district court
dismissed the complaint against Green. 7 On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded.' 8
The case against Green was far from obvious. The agreement be-
tween Green and Jalen allowed Jalen to sell records in Green's stores
in exchange for a percentage of sales. Jalen ordered and paid for all
of the records sold, and Green did not actively participate in the sales
nor know of the infringements. Indeed, the district court refused to
impose liability because "Green, in effect, was a lessor of space to
Jalen under a percentage lease,"' 9 and the Second Circuit could easily
have affirmed on the ground that Jalen was not Green's employee.20
Such a ruling would have been consistent with the general tort rule
14 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
15 For cases referring to Shapiro as providing the definition of vicarious liability, see
Gordon v. Nextel Communications, 345 F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2003); Adobe Systems, Inc. v.
Canus Prods, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996); Polygram Int'l Publ'g Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc.,
855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (D. Mass. 1994).
16 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 305-06.
17 Id. at 306.
18 ld. at 310.
19 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 35 U.S.P.Q. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
20 See id. (the District court opinion does not state the legal basis for its dismissal of the
claim against Green).
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that respondeat superior liability exists only when the defendant and
primary tortfeasor are in a master/servant relationship.2'
However, the Second Circuit saw the case differently. After ac-
knowledging the usual limit of respondeat superior, the court noted
that courts sometimes impose respondeat superior when no mas-
ter/servant relationship exists.22 The court therefore was willing to
consider holding Green liable in the case at hand. In doing so, the
court consciously turned away from the guidance of tort law and cre-
ated a new definition for vicarious liability that expressed a broader
vision of liability. The court wrote:
Many of the elements which have given rise to the doctrine of
respondeat superior may also be evident in factual settings
other than that of a technical employer-employee relation-
ship. When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an
obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of
copyrighted materials-even in the absence of actual knowl-
edge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired-the
purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the im-
position of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploita-
tion.23
Next, the court applied this definition to Green by referring to
prior precedent distinguishing the vicarious liability of dance hall
operators from landlords. The court noted that landlords are not held
liable for infringement committed by tenants who pay a fixed rental
rate because landlords do not supervise tenants and receive no profits
from the infringement. By contrast, dance hall operators are held
liable when musicians they hire perform copyrighted music without
authorization, even if the musicians are independent contractors.
Such liability presumably exists because dance hall operators can
supervise the musicians they hire. Moreover, dance hall operators
have "a most definite financial interest" in the infringement because
patrons come to hear the infringing performances.24 According to the
court, Green was more like the dance hall operator than a landlord
because Green retained the right to supervise Jalen's operation and
received a percentage of Jalen's sales.25 The court further supported
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (defining master/servant relation-
ship); id. at § 219 (limiting liability of master with respect to torts not committed by servant
within scope of employment).
22 316 F.2d at 307.
23 Id. (citations omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 308.
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this outcome by stating that the imposition of liability on Green
would encourage businesses like Green to prevent infringement or
insure against infringement. If the court were to decide otherwise,
businesses might shield themselves from liability by delegating in-
fringing activities to independent contractors.2 6
Shapiro illustrates how judicial concerns about copyright in-
fringement have encouraged courts to expand the scope of vicarious
liability. The court explicitly considered doctrinal limits on vicarious
liability from tort and rejected them because "the purposes of copy-
right law may best be effectuated by the imposition of liability. 2 7
This resulted in the creation of a new test designed to impose liability
beyond the limits suggested by tort law. Such liability might have
been justified as a matter of abstract theory, and the court no doubt
sincerely believed that it had promulgated a workable limit on the
reach of vicarious copyright liability. However, future courts have
given Shapiro an even more open-ended interpretation by steadily
weakening the requirements of control and financial interest.
Consider, for example, Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v.
Nevada/TIG, Inc.,z8 a case that raised the question of whether the or-
ganizers of the world's largest computer industry trade show were
vicariously liable for copyright infringement allegedly committed by
exhibitors at the show.29 After a one day, non-jury trial, the district
court held for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish infringement by any exhibitor. 30  However, the
court also addressed the question of vicarious liability and held that
the defendants would have been liable if the underlying infringement
31had been proven.
The court's opinion on vicarious liability started by citing Shapiro
and the Second Circuit's conscious decision to impose vicarious li-
ability beyond the usual limits found in tort.32 Next, the court began a
fairly lengthy discussion about the purposes behind vicarious liability
and the appropriate interpretation of Shapiro.33 The court wrote:
26 Id. at 308-09.
27 Id. at 307.
28 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994).
29 Id. at 1317-18.
30 Id. at 1318, 1323-24.
31 Id. at 1324-33.
32 Id. at 1324
The [Shapiro] court extracted from these cases the principle that, rather than follow-
ing strict agency or independent contractor doctrines, courts should impose vicarious
liability when the facts indicate that the defendant has the 'right and ability to super-
vise' the infringer coupled with 'an obvious and direct financial interest in exploita-
tion of the copyrighted materials.'
13 Polygram Int'l. Publishing, 855 F. Supp. at 1324-27.
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When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in
which identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is
ordinarily fair and reasonable to place responsibility for those
losses on the person who profits, even if that person makes
arrangements for others to perform the acts that foreseeably
[sic] cause the losses. The law of vicarious liability treats the
expected losses as simply another cost of doing business.
The enterprise and the person profiting from it are better able
than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose
act caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to
others who have profited from the enterprise. In addition,
placing responsibility for the loss on the enterprise has the
added benefit of creating a greater incentive for the enterprise
to police its operations carefully to avoid unnecessary
losses.
34
The Polygram court stated that Shapiro implemented these policies
and then the court adopted generous interpretations of both prongs of
the Shapiro testy.
With respect to the right and ability to supervise, the court con-
sciously rejected the proposition that a defendant had to have control
over "the manner and means of performance, '' 36 and it did so despite
explicitly recognizing that such a requirement would be "common
elsewhere in the law of vicarious liability. 37 Instead, the court en-
dorsed the principle that the simple ability to veto the use of music by
the primary infringer would be enough to establish the necessary con-
trol.38 The court found that the trade show organizers had this ability
because they could set the terms under which exhibitors rented space
and employed staff who could patrol the convention hall to ensure
that no music would be played.39
The court went even further in interpreting the requirement of an
"obvious and direct financial interest." According to the court, the
law permitted the imposition of vicarious liability on a showing of
"direct or indirect financial benefit." 40 This contradicted Shapiro,
and it directly affected the outcome of the case. Not surprisingly, the
Polygram defendant had argued that it lacked the necessary financial
interest to support vicarious liability. This argument had doctrinal
34 Id. at 1325.
35 Id. at 1324-26.
36 Id. at 1326.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1328-30.
40 Id. at 1326 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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merit. The Shapiro defendant's financial interest was direct in the
sense that it took a percentage of the sales generated by infringing
records. By contrast, the Polygram defendant earned no money from
infringement by trade show exhibitors, so its financial interest in the
infringement could not be considered direct. The court's expansion
of Shapiro rendered this argument irrelevant. Removing the require-
ment of a "direct" financial interest meant that "commercial gain
from the overall operation and either a direct or indirect financial
benefit from the infringement itself' would support liability. Obvi-
ously, the defendant operated the trade show to make money. Addi-
tionally, the performance of music by exhibitors made the show's
exhibits more attractive to the show's attendees. Hence, the defen-
dant had the necessary indirect financial interest.41
Polygram has greatly influenced the law of vicarious copyright li-
ability. There are, of course, opinions that take a more cautious ap-
proach to vicarious liability than Polygram.4 2 However, the Poly-
gram approach has become prevalent through its adoption by the
Ninth Circuit in the leading case of Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction.
4 3
Fonovisa's facts were somewhat similar to Polygram's, yet readily
distinguishable. The defendant Cherry Auction operated a swap meet
at which vendors would rent booths for a daily fee. Cherry Auction
also collected revenue from admission fees paid by customers as well
as parking and concessions. 44 Cherry Auction's vendors apparently
included a number of individuals who sold counterfeit recordings of
copyrighted music, and Cherry Auction knew that such activity was
going on. A 1991 Fresno County Sheriff's raid resulted in seizure of
more than 38,000 such recordings, and the Sheriff specifically ad-
vised Cherry Auction that the sale of counterfeit recordings was still
continuing a year later.45 The plaintiff Fonovisa held copyright in a
number of the infringed recordings and filed a complaint alleging
both vicarious and contributory liability. 46 The district court dis-
missed the complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.47
Polygram's influence over Fonovisa becomes apparent upon an
examination of the district court's decision and the appellate court's
reaction. The district court's dismissal of the complaint was perfectly
understandable as a measured reading of Shapiro. The Shapiro de-
41 Id. at 1331-32.
42 See, e.g., Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal.
2001); Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
43 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
44 Id. at 261-62.
45 Id. at 261.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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fendant Green had the necessary control over its concessionaire Jalen
because Green had retained the right to fire Jalen's employees. Green
had the necessary financial interest because it took a percentage of
Jalen's receipts from counterfeit record sales. By contrast, Cherry
Auction did not have the necessary control over its vendors because it
had less control over them than Green did over Jalen. More impor-
tantly, Cherry Auction lacked an obvious and direct financial interest
in the underlying infringement because it did not share in the receipts
derived from the vendors' sale of counterfeit records.48
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit's reversal closely follows the blue-
print laid down by Polygram. Indeed, the court characterizes Poly-
gram as "[tihe most recent and comprehensive discussion of the evo-
lution of the doctrine of vicarious liability for copyright infringe-
ment." 49 The Ninth Circuit then held that Cherry Auction had the
necessary control because it could terminate vendors for selling coun-
terfeit records and had the ability to police the premises on which the
swap meet took place.50 Cherry Auction also had the requisite finan-
cial interest because it profited from admission, parking, and conces-
sion stand revenues paid by those who attended the swap meet to buy
counterfeit records. 5' This had the effect of making vicarious copy-
right liability relatively easy to allege and prove.
2. Contributory Copyright Liability
The modem development of contributory liability in copyright be-
gins with Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records,
Inc.52 The plaintiffs, four music publishers, alleged that Mark-Fi Re-
cords made and sold records that violated the plaintiffs' copyrights.53
According to the complaint, Mark-Fi was a typically shady bootleg
record operation. It sold recordings for very low prices and its execu-
tive absconded after those sales, making it impossible to serve Mark-
Fi with process.54 Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs looked for someone
else to sue, and they targeted a number of defendants who did busi-
ness with Mark-Fi. These defendants included an advertising agency
that purchased air time for the broadcast of commercials for the in-
fringing album, the owner of the radio stations which played the
commercials., and a company which packaged and mailed the infring-
48 Id. at 263.
49 Id. at 262.
50 Id. at 262.
51 Id. at 263-64.
52 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
53 Id. at 401.
54 Id.
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ing albums to people who had already ordered and paid for the al-
bums through Mark-Fi.55
The Screen Gems litigation developed along predictable lines. The
plaintiffs acknowledged that the defendants had not themselves com-
mitted infringement, 56 but they claimed that summary judgment
against the defendants was necessary to discourage infringement.5 7
The defendants responded by filing their own motion for summary
judgment on the ground that they did not directly participate in Mark-
Fi's infringing scheme and did not control or directly benefit from
that scheme. 8 The court denied both motions in an opinion focused
primarily on contributory liability.
In so ruling, the court noted that plaintiffs sought to hold the de-
fendants liable for assisting Mark-Fi despite knowing about the in-
fringing nature of Mark-Fi's records.5 9 According to the plaintiffs,
the defendants actually knew or should have known about Mark-Fi's
infringement from the suspiciously low price of Mark-Fi's records
and the nature of Mark-Fi's operation.6° The court considered this
argument important because copyright infringement is a tort. Accord-
ingly, "the basic common law doctrine is that one who knowingly
participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable
with the prime tortfeasor. ' '6' The court went on to find that a triable
issue of fact existed about whether the defendants had actual or con-
structive knowledge of Mark-Fi's infringement and still furthered
Mark-Fi' s scheme.62
The development of contributory liability continued in Gershwin
Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists' Management, Inc.63 In this case, the
defendant Columbia Artists' Management managed a number of per-
forming artists. Columbia also facilitated the creation and operation
of local organizations to sponsor concerts in various communities at
which Columbia managed artists would appear.64 Columbia would
profit by taking a share of each artist's performance fee.65 As it
turned out, Columbia's artists sometimes performed copyrighted mu-
55 Id. at 401-02.
56 Id. at 401.
57 Id. at 403 ("The plaintiffs acknowledge that such indeed is their purpose as the only fea-
sible means to meet the challenge of the bootleg record.").
11 Id. at 402-03.
59 Id. at 403.
60 Id. at 403-04.
61 Id. at 403.
62 Id. at 403-04. The court did find in favor of a fourth defendant, an officer and stock-
holder of the advertising agency, because he was on leave from the company at the time.
63 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
64 Id. at 1160-61.
65 Id. at 1161.
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sic without authorization at these concerts, and the copyright holders
sued Columbia for vicarious and contributory liability.66
The Second Circuit imposed contributory liability and cited Screen
67Gems to support its decision. According to the Second Circuit,
"[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,
may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer., 68 Columbia was
therefore liable because it played a major role in creating concert en-
gagements for its artists despite knowing that its artists performed
copyrighted works without permission. 69 Among other things, the
court noted that Columbia knew the works being performed by each
artist yet continued to promote those concerts. 70
The decisions of Screen Gems and Gershwin rest on the idea that it
is wrong to provide significant assistance to another with knowledge
that the assistance will facilitate copyright infringement. However,
this does not necessarily mean that any kind of knowledge and any
kind of assistance should establish liability. It is one thing if a defen-
dant knows that a specific person will commit a particular act of in-
fringement and chooses to provide direct and significant assistance.
In such a case, the defendant's decision to provide the assistance is
unreasonable, and his culpability makes it fair to hold him legally
responsible for the infringement. By contrast, it is something else if a
defendant does not know the identity of an infringer, the nature or
likelihood of the infringement, and provides indirect assistance to the
infringer. Such a defendant's choice to provide assistance may be
entirely reasonable and it would then be unfair to hold him liable.
The foregoing shows that contributory copyright liability requires
a finding that the defendant's knowledge and contribution are suffi-
ciently unreasonable to support a particular level of- culpability. In
Screen Gems and Gershwin, the defendants knew the specific identi-
ties of the infringers, knew the specific works infringed, and directly
promoted or distributed infringing performances or products. Such
specific knowledge and direct assistance support an inference that
these defendants were fairly culpable in their behavior. One might
therefore expect courts to limit contributory liability to cases with
similar facts, but this has not occurred. Instead, a number of courts
have accepted the proposition that general knowledge and indirect
facilitation of infringement establish contributory liability, and this
66 Id. at 1160.
67 Id. at 1162.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1162-63.
70 Id. at 1161.
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has opened the door to further expansion of third party copyright li-
ability.
Once again, the leading case is Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction.?
Brief reflection reveals that the case for contributory liability was far
from clear. Cherry Auction knew that some of those who rented swap
meet booths were selling infringing records and tapes, and the avail-
ability of swap meet booths facilitated infringing sales.72 At the same
time, however, Cherry Auction apparently did not know the infring-
ers' identities, and the renting of swap meet booths is not the same
kind of assistance as the promotion of concerts or distribution of in-
fringing records. Indeed, the district court recognized the relative
weakness of the claim in dismissing Fonovisa's complaint.73
The relative weakness of the plaintiff's case for contributory liabil-
ity means that the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court ex-
tended contributory liability beyond the facts of Screen Gems and
Gershwin. The court refers to Gershwin as the "classic statement" of
the doctrine,74 but it applies the Gershwin elements in a somewhat
sloppy and expansive way. The court simply stated that Fonovisa
adequately alleged the requirement of knowledge. The opinion could
have gone on to explain that contributory liability normally requires
specific knowledge about an infringer's identity and the works in-
fringed because such specificity permits an inference of culpability,
and that Cherry Auction's unusual form of general knowledge permit-
ted a similar inference. However, by not doing so, the Ninth Circuit
allowed an allegation of general knowledge, as opposed to specific
knowledge, to satisfy the first element of a contributory copyright
liability claim without any analysis of the connection between the
defendant's knowledge and culpability.
75
The Ninth Circuit followed this up with an equally broad under-
standing of material contribution. To be sure, the court discussed
Cherry Auction's failure to assist law enforcement and its willingness
to foster infringement, and it could have stated that material contribu-
tion required active encouragement or concealment of infringement
71 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cit. 1996).
72 See id. at 260-61.
73 Id. at 261.
74 Id. at 264.
75 Note that this Article is not taking the position that the Ninth Circuit reached the wrong
conclusion. The sheriff's raids and the prevalence of infringing vendors might well have sup-
ported the kind of culpability that would justify liability. Rather, the Article is pointing out that
the Ninth Circuit's analysis does not properly establish the connection between knowledge and
culpability. This disconnect between knowledge and culpability creates an interpretation of law
in which any kind of actual knowledge satisfies one of the prerequisites for contributory liabil-
ity.
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and infringers. However, the court did not do this and stated that the
mere facilitation of infringement would suffice.7 6 This had the effect
of making contributory liability much easier to allege and prove.
3. The Effect of Fonovisa
Fonovisa clearly helps plaintiffs who bring third party copyright
claims against technology providers.77 After all, technology providers
can always refuse to distribute technology to potential infringers, and
the possibility of infringement generally increases demand for the
technology and the provider's profits. Plaintiffs will therefore consis-
tently argue that Fonovisa holds technology providers vicariously
liable for user infringement. Similarly, technology providers fre-
quently know that people use their technology to infringe, and that
their technology facilitates infringement. Accordingly, plaintiffs will
surely contend that Fonovisa imposes contributory liability on tech-
nology providers.
Of course, this does not mean that technology providers always
lose third party copyright liability cases, or that providers are destined
to do so in the future. Courts obviously will not decide every case in
the plaintiff's favor, and they occasionally recognize and resist Fono-
visa's potential for practically limitless expansion of liability. 78 How-
ever, these efforts generally rely on factual distinctions that have not
resulted in widely adopted statements of principle that effectively
limit Fonovisa's reach. Accordingly, Fonovisa offers plaintiffs con-
siderable doctrinal support that cannot be easily denied because it
comes from a leading case that adopts a blunt analysis devoid of im-
portant nuance.
76 76 F.3d at 264 ("[W]e agree ... that providing the site and facilities for known infring-
ing activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability.").
77 See Barbara Kolsun, and Jonathan Bayer, Indirect Infringement and Counterfeiting:
Remedies Available Against Those Who Knowingly Rent To Counterfeiters, 16 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 383, 409-10 (1998) (describing Fonovisa as lowering the standard of Gershwin and
exposing new defendants to liability); David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the
Digital Age, 10 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 1, 34 n.142 (1996) (Fonovisa "arguably portends a
liberalization of the standards for vicarious liability in cyberspace"); Kenneth Walton, Is A
Website Like A Flea Market Stall? How Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction Increases the Risk of
Third-Pary Copyright Infringement Liability For Online Service Providers, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 921, 942 (1997) (describing Fonovisa's expansion of third party copyright
liability, especially vicarious liability).
78 See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing degree of
financial interest in affirming dismissal of plaintiffs claim of vicarious copyright liability
against Internet service provider); Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688,
697-99 (D. Md. 2001) (distinguishing claim against Web site operator from Fonovisa); Adobe
Systems, Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (reading Fonovisa
somewhat narrowly and denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in case involving
sales of infringing software at a computer fair).
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B. Sony and the Benefits of Technology
The second major influence in the law of third party copyright li-
ability is the case of Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios.79 In Sony, the Supreme Court considered whether Sony was
contributorily liable for infringement committed by users of its Be-
tamax VCRs. The Sony plaintiffs owned the copyrights on various
works that were broadcast as ordinary television programs. They
contended that Sony became liable for copyright infringement by sell-
ing VCRs to members of the public who used the VCRs to copy the
plaintiffs' works for later viewing.80 The plaintiffs lost in the district
court, but the 9th Circuit reversed, setting the stage for one of copy-
right's most important Supreme Court decisions.
Sony could easily have been a case that supported the expansive
reading of Screen Gems, Gershwin, and their progeny. The 9th Cir-
cuit's reasoning clearly foreshadowed the analysis later adopted in
Fonovisa.81 According to the court, Sony had knowledge because
Sony knew'that some purchasers of VCRs would use them to in-
fringe. 82 Additionally, Sony materially contributed to the purchasers'
infringement because Sony's customers would be unable to commit
infringement without the VCRs.83 This reasoning could easily have
been affirmed as consistent with Screen Gems, and Gershwin.
84
However, the Supreme Court rejected this possibility and reversed.
In reversing, the Supreme Court applied a somewhat unusual, but
ultimately wise, cost-benefit analysis to the problem of secondary
copyright liability. According to the Court, the question of Sony's
liability depended on the characterization of its knowledge. The
Court wrote, "[i]f vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this
case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with construc-
79 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
80 'Id. at 420.
81 The Ninth Circuit Sony opinion was handed down in 1981, and Fonovisa was decided
in 1996.
82 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir.
1981)
The corporate appellees 'know' that the Betamax will be used to reproduce copy-
righted materials. In fact, that is the most conspicuous use of the product. That use is
intended, expected, encouraged, and the source of the product's consumer appeal.
The record establishes that appellees knew and expected that Betamax's major use
would be to record copyrighted programs off-the-air.
Id. at 975.
83 Id.at 975-76 ("[T]here is no doubt that appellees have met the other requirements for
contributory infringement-inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the infringing
conduct of another.").
m Indeed, the court cited the standard definition from Gershwin. Id.at 975.
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tive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. 85
The Court then explained why Sony lacked constructive knowl-
edge. If the Court had simply followed the reasoning of cases like
Screen Gems or Gershwin, it would have explained its decision in
terms of whether Sony deserved to be held liable because it knew
what its customers were up to. However, the Court chose not to ex-
plain its decision with reference to Sony's culpability. Instead, the
Court analyzed the broader social consequences of liability. In doing
so, the Court gave great importance to noninfringing uses of VCRs.
These included the authorized copying of certain television programs
and the unauthorized, temporary copying of programs for later view-
ing that constituted fair use.86
The Court understood that liability against Sony would eliminate
the infringing and noninfringing use of VCRs.87 As an initial matter,
Sony would probably have responded to the financial burden of po-
tentially unlimited copyright liability removing VCRs from the mar-
ket. Moreover, Courts routinely grant injunctions against copyright
infringers,88 so liability against Sony would have given copyright
holders the legal power to prohibit the sale of VCRs, even if Sony
still wanted to sell them. Either way, the removal of VCRs from the
market would affect both infringing and noninfringing uses of VCRs.
According to the Court, contributory liability's broad effect on
noninfringing uses showed that such liability does not always advance
society's best interests. To be sure, liability would have the benefit of
reducing infringement, but society would also lose the benefits asso-
85 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). The
Court's use of "vicarious" liability is confusing because the entire discussion that follows inter-
prets the meaning of constructive knowledge, which in turn is an element of contributory, and
not vicarious, copyright liability. The Article proceeds on the assumption that the Court in-
tended to discuss contributory liability.
86 See id. at 442-56.
87 The court wrote:
It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright
owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this case, the exclusive right to
distribute VTR's simply because they may be used to infringe copyrights. That,
however, is the logical implication of their claim. The request for an injunction be-
low indicates that respondents seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their
suggestion in this Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created
compulsory license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respon-
dents, for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in
VTR's to Sony in return for a royalty.
464 U.S. at 441, n. 21.
88 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2005) (authorizing injunctive relief); Mark A. Lemley and Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147,
150 (1998) ("In copyright cases, though, preliminary injunctions are granted pretty much as a
matter of course...").
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ciated with noninfringing uses of VCRs. The Court therefore decided
to balance the benefits of contributory liability against its costs, 89 but
it conducted that balancing in a somewhat surprising way. Instead of
simply comparing the benefits of stopping infringement against the
loss of existing noninfringing uses for VCRs, the Court weighed the
benefits of enforcing copyright against the loss of existing and poten-
tial noninfringing uses of VCRs. This led to the conclusion that "the
sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely
be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."90
At first blush, the Court's consideration of potential noninfringing
uses for VCRs seems odd because there can be no guarantee the po-
tential uses would ever arise. It therefore seems rather speculative to
account for the loss of such potential uses in deciding whether to im-
pose contributory liability on defendants like Sony. Further reflection
reveals, however, that the Court's reasoning made sense. History
teaches us that society rarely appreciates the full benefits of new
technologies immediately upon their invention. It sometimes takes
years, or even decades, for society to identify highly productive uses
for new technologies, and the implementation of today's technology
is a necessary prerequisite to the development of tomorrow's technol-
ogy. 91 Accordingly, courts that do not weigh the loss of potential
noninfringing uses in a cost-benefit analysis of contributory liability
will underestimate the social losses that such liability imposes. This
would in turn lead to the overuse of contributory copyright liability.
Sony therefore wisely admonishes future courts to avoid secondary
copyright liability for technology providers if the technology in ques-
tion could have substantial noninfringing use.9 2
89 Sony, 417 U.S. at 442.
9 Id.
9' A striking example of this would be the effect of radio technology. When first in-
vented, radio was used as a method of communication that facilitated copyright infringement,
namely the unlicensed broadcast of music. Since then, the basic technology of radio has given
rise to radar, television, cellular telephones, and many other socially valuable inventions that
could not have been foreseen if a cost-benefit analysis of radio technology had been conducted
in the early 20"h century. See Dave Finley, The Radio Century, ALBUQUERQUE J., November 26,
1999, available at http://www.aoc.nrao.edul-dfinley/radcent.html (visited January 30, 2005)
(describing radio technology and some of its future uses).
92 Indeed, the wisdom of this admonition is confirmed by the history of VCRs themselves.
At the time of Sony, the principal identified noninfringing uses for VCRs were the authorized
taping of television programs and unauthorized timeshifting. The movie industry clearly felt
that the value of these uses was not large enough to make up for what the industry believed
would be catastrophic losses in the value of copyrighted movies. Ironically, the VCR has not
had the effect predicted by the movie industry. To the contrary, the VCR made possible the
market for the lucrative sale and rental of movies on videotape. This market has proven so
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II. THIRD PARTY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY AND PEER-TO-PEER
TECHNOLOGY
The foregoing makes a general outline of the peer-to-peer puzzle
fairly clear. On the one hand, courts could follow the expansive inter-
pretation of vicarious and contributory liability embodied in Fonovisa
and hold the creators of peer-to-peer networks liable for infringement
committed by those who use the networks.93 On the other hand,
courts could vigorously apply Sony and refuse to hold the creators of
peer-to-peer networks liable. Both of these possibilities are doctri-
nally plausible, but each has its benefits and costs.
A generous application of third party copyright liability would un-
doubtedly prevent copyright infringement by discouraging people
from starting or maintaining peer-to-peer networks. Indeed, many
will shy away from even researching or experimenting with such
technology. The benefits of stopping infringement will, however,
come with a price. Peer-to-peer networks support more than in-
fringement. People can use them to distribute files of public domain
material or files that the copyright holder wants to have widely
shared. Moreover, as Sony has taught, peer-to-peer networks will
probably have valuable noninfringing uses that society has not even
thought of yet. Accordingly, if courts outlaw peer-to-peer technol-
ogy, they do so at the cost of all present and future noninfringing uses
of that technology. By contrast, a vigorous application of Sony would
give society the current and future benefits of peer-to-peer technol-
ogy, but it would also allow a great deal of copyright infringement to
continue. Such infringement could damage the economic viability of
some businesses that sell copyrighted material.94
profitable that many movies now make more through that market than through exhibition in
movie theaters. Society's experience with VCRs illustrates why the Supreme Court was wise to
look past predictions of gloom and instead accept the likelihood that VCRs would bring society(and indeed copyright holders) significant benefits that could not have been anticipated at the
time of the Sony litigation.
93 With respect to vicarious liability, control arguably exists because peer-to-peer provid-
ers can keep potential infringers from getting the technology, and a financial interest might exist
because peer-to-peer providers hope to profit from their networks. With respect to contributory
liability, knowledge arguably exists because peer-to-peer providers know that people will mis-
use the technology, and material contribution could exist because peer-to-peer technology
facilitates infringement.
94 Economists have differed on the actual effect of peer-to-peer file sharing. See Kai-
Lung Hui & Ivan Png, Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music, 2 CONTRIBU-
TIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, No. 1, Art. 11 (2003), available at
http://www.bepress.comibejeap/contributions/vol2/issl/artl1/ (finding that peer-to-peer file
sharing decreased demand for music CDs, but in smaller amounts than estimated by the music
industry); Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate and Record Industry? The Evidence
so Far, in GARY LIBECAP, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 15 (2004),
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The foregoing suggests that society's best interests would be
served by a compromise between the all-or-nothing approaches sug-
gested above. Legitimate technology developers ought to have room
to experiment with and implement peer-to-peer systems without fear
that they will be liable for the deliberate misbehavior of others. At
the same time, copyright holders ought to have meaningful recourse
against those who irresponsibly facilitate infringement. It therefore
comes as no surprise that the courts are trying to strike the suggested
compromise. As of this writing, courts have decided three cases in-
volving peer-to-peer technology, and the results have been split, with
two favoring liability and one against liability. 95
Ideally, the repeated judicial consideration of peer-to-peer tech-
nology would create a cogent interpretation of law that connects doc-
trine to the policy concerns raised by peer-to-peer technology. Such a
connection would guide decisions towards the public interest by
drawing judicial attention to important considerations like motivation
and the relative costs and benefits of particular peer-to-peer systems.
Unfortunately, this has not happened. As this section will show,
courts are trying to do the right thing, but they are hampered by the
clumsy structure of vicarious and contributory liability. This suggests
that a cogent solution to the peer-to-peer puzzle is unlikely without
significant doctrinal reform.
A. Napster
The first peer-to-peer case to be decided was A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc.9 6 In this case, the defendant Napster, Inc. established
and maintained the eponymous file swapping service. Individuals
who wanted to use the Napster system would do so by downloading
and installing Napster's MusicShare software on their personal com-
puters.97 Once installed, this software allowed users to connect via
available at http://www.utdallas.edu/-iebowit/ (concluding that file sharing does harm the
music industry, but that the harm may not be fatal); Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The
Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales. An Empirical Analysis, available at
www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-March20 0 4.pdf (concluding that file sharing does not
affect record sales). It is therefore possible to argue that peer-to-peer systems cause little or no
damage to copyright holders of any works infringed. The empirical accuracy of such arguments
could affect the outcome of any cost-benefit analysis concerning peer-to-peer technology, but
this Article does not take a position on the truth of such arguments.
95 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004); In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2003); A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
96 239 F.3d 1004.
97 Id. at 1011.
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the Internet to Napster's central servers.98 These servers kept track of
all users logged into the Napster system, including the names of any
music files each user was willing to share.99 Napster users who
wanted copies of a particular song could then type in a query and the
Napster system would return a list of all "host users" who had made
the song available. The requesting user could then choose a host user,
and the MusicShare software would send a request from the request-
ing user's computer directly to the host user's computer. The host
user's computer would then send the desired copy. 100
The Napster service proved wildly popular. The district court
noted that Napster expected to have 75 million users by the end of
2000, and that 10,000 files per second were shared over the Napster
system. 01 Most of these shared files were unauthorized copies of
copyrighted songs. 0 2 This meant that the Napster system supported a
great deal of copyright infringement. °3 The music industry took con-
siderable exception to this, and it notified Napster that its users were
sharing unauthorized copies of copyrighted songs. The music indus-
try demanded that Napster stop this infringement, but Napster refused
on the ground that Napster itself committed no copyright infringe-
ment. Only Napster's users infringed because the copying and trans-
mission of copyrighted material happened only through direct com-
munication between Napster users. Napster took the position that it
was not responsible for its users' behavior. Not surprisingly, the mu-
sic industry disagreed, and a number of its members sued Napster on
theories of vicarious and contributory liability.104 The plaintiffs suc-
cessfully moved for a preliminary injunction against Napster's opera-
tion, and Napster appealed to the Ninth Circuit.10 5 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court in an opinion that struggles to reconcile the
doctrinal themes of third party copyright liability.
Consider first the plaintiffs' claim of contributory copyright liabil-
ity. Fonovisa's generous interpretation of contributory liability made
it easy for the court to find Napster liable for its users' infringement.
After all, the recording industry had complained many times about the
infringing use of Napster. This gave Napster knowledge comparable
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1012.
10Id.
101 A & M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
102Napster. 293 F.3d at 1013-14.
103 The copyright code reserves to the copyright holder exclusive fights of reproduction
and distribution. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Violation of these rights over a peer-to-peer network there-
fore constitutes infringement.
04Napster, 293 F.3d at 1011.
105 Id.
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to that of Cherry Auction, which knew that most of those renting
swap meet booths were committing infringement. Thus, when Nap-
ster continued to make its service available for infringing use, Napster
became liable. At the same time, however, Sony could just as easily
have been applied to shield Napster from liability. Like Sony, Nap-
ster knew that some, but not all, of its customers committed infringe-
ment. Moreover, as noted earlier, there were actual and potential non-
infringing uses for Napster.1°6 The Ninth Circuit could have charac-
terized these noninfringing uses as "substantial" and concluded that
Sony prohibited imputing constructive knowledge to Napster.
The court responded to this problem by distinguishing Napster
from Sony, but not very successfully. It began by observing that the
Supreme Court refused to impute constructive knowledge to Sony.
This led to the conclusion that Napster's infringing capabilities alone
were not enough to justify the imputation of constructive knowl-
edge. 107 However, the court argued that Sony did not apply to Napster
because the plaintiffs had clearly notified Napster that specific works
were being traded on the Napster system. The court then found that
Napster had actual knowledge of infringement on its system, and
Sony did not apply because Sony only barred the court from imputing
constructive knowledge to Napster.10 8 This reasoning seems persua-
sive on first inspection, but closer scrutiny reveals some problems.
The Napster court's analysis questionably characterizes the differ-
ence between Napster's knowledge and Sony's knowledge as one of
kind, and not of degree. Sony's logic implies that actual knowledge
exists only when the defendant knows that a particular person is going
to commit infringement. Without question, one could argue that ac-
tual knowledge exists when a defendant knows that its technology
supports infringement, even if the defendant does not know exactly.
who commits the infringement. However, Sony's logic rejects this
possibility. As the district court noted, Sony advertised its VCRs by
suggesting that purchasers make libraries of recorded copyrighted
material. 1°9 Additionally, Sony conducted surveys that showed sub-
stantial use of VCRs for that purpose.110 It is therefore difficult to
conclude that Sony did not truly know that some of its customers used
its VCRs to infringe."' The Supreme Court's refusal to characterize
1061d. at 1021.
107 Id. at 1020-21.
108Id. at 1021.
109 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436 (C.D. Cal
1979), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
1ld. at 438-39.
Il See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that
Sony surely knew about infringing use of VCRs).
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this knowledge as "actual knowledge" for purposes of contributory
liability means that actual knowledge doesn't exist until a defendant
knows that a particular person is going to commit infringement. A
generalized knowledge that someone will commit infringement is not
enough.
An application of Sony's logic to the facts of Napster shows that
Napster did not have actual knowledge of its users' infringement.
Like Sony, Napster truly knew that its users committed infringement,
but it did not know exactly which users were doing so. Napster there-
fore could not have had actual knowledge within the meaning of con-
tributory copyright liability, and its liability would have to depend on
the existence of constructive knowledge. This does not mean that
Napster's situation was indistinguishable from Sony's. Napster's pri-
mary use was infringing, while the primary use of VCRs was nonin-
fringing. The case for Napster's constructive knowledge was there-
fore stronger than the case for Sony's constructive knowledge. How-
ever, this distinction is one of degree, and not of kind.
The foregoing shows that the Ninth Circuit's attempt to integrate
Sony and Fonovisa is not satisfactory. If Napster's liability depends
on constructive knowledge, then Sony applies. The Ninth Circuit was
not free to impute such knowledge to Napster unless it determined
that Napster was not capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Of
course, Napster could be used for noninfringing purposes. Users
could legally share music files with the consent of copyright holders,
and public domain recordings would be fair game as well. However,
the overwhelming prevalence of Napster's infringing uses left open
the question of whether its noninfringing uses could ever be "substan-
tial." As noted earlier, Sony's policy concerning substantial nonin-
fringing uses reflects the wise policy judgment that technology should
not be declared illegal without comparing the benefits gained by out-
lawing technology used for infringement against the costs of losing
the present and future noninfringing uses of the technology.1 1 2 It was
therefore questionable for the Ninth Circuit to find against Napster
without conducting the cost-benefit analysis implied by Sony.
The Napster court's analysis of vicarious liability was also prob-
lematic. Not surprisingly, the opinion followed the approach of
Fonovisa. The court stated that Napster had the necessary control
because it could block users from its system.1 3 Additionally, thecourt found that Napster had the necessary financial interest in user
112 See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
113Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (stating that "[t]he ability to block infringers' access to a par-
ticular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to supervise."
(citing Fonovisa Inc., v. Cherry Auction Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996))).
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infringement because the availability of infringing music files at-
tracted users to Napster. 14 The Ninth Circuit could have held Nap-
ster liable on precisely this reasoning, but it chose to elaborate in a
curious way.
Ordinarily, the existence of vicarious liability means that the de-
fendant can do almost nothing to escape liability short of preventing
infringement. The elements of vicarious liability make this clear. A
defendant who has enough control over an infringer and a high
enough financial interest in the infringement is liable for the in-
fringement. Such a defendant can escape liability only if it changes
its relationship with the underlying infringer, either by giving up con-
trol over the infringing activity or by reducing financial interest in the
infringement. In Napster's case, it seems highly unlikely that these
changes could ever occur. After all, the court found that Napster had
the necessary control because it could kick infringers off of the Nap-
ster system. It is hard to imagine that Napster would ever allow peo-
ple to use the Napster system without Napster's consent. Similarly,
users would always be attracted to Napster in order to download mu-
sic. Napster's attractiveness increases with the number and variety of
files on its system, so infringing music would always be a draw to the
Napster system. This makes it almost impossible for Napster to not
have the necessary financial interest in its user's infringements.
Oddly enough, the Ninth Circuit indicated that Napster had an-
other way to escape liability for its users' misbehavior. The court
wrote, "To escape the imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved
right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent."' 1 5 This meant
that Napster did not have to prevent infringement in order to escape
liability. Napster only had to make an effort to stop infringement
consistent with the architecture of the Napster system. 116 Napster
could accomplish this by refusing to list files with names similar to
those of copyrighted songs because this would prevent users from
sending download requests for those files.
17
This interpretation of vicarious liability is very odd because it has
the effect of converting vicarious liability into a form of contributory
liability. A defendant who has the necessary knowledge of another's
infringement is liable if he provides the infringer with material assis-
1
4 Id. at 1023. ("Financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material 'acts
as a 'draw' for customers."').
15Id. at 1023.
11
6 d. at 1024 ("Put differently, Napster's reserved 'right and ability' to police is cabined
by the system's current architecture.").
"
7 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (describing operation of the Napster sys-
tem).
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tance.18 The logical structure of these elements implies that a defen-
dant can escape contributory liability by changing the nature of the
assistance he offers the infringer. If provision of the unaltered Nap-
ster service were considered material assistance (as indeed it was by
the court), provision of the Napster service without the listing of in-
fringing files would probably not be material assistance because such
a service would offer relatively little support to those wanting to com-
mit infringement.
The conversion of vicarious liability to contributory liability offers
clues about what the Napster court may have been thinking about the
precedent it had to work with. The court apparently believed that
existing doctrine, particularly Fonovisa, required a finding against
Napster on both contributory and vicarious liability grounds. How-
ever, the court might also have thought that vicarious liability would
be too harsh because it would expose too many technology providers
to liability. After all, many computer and internet technologies facili-
tate copyright infringement. If, as the Napster court believed, the
ability to deny a service and the draw of infringing material establish
liability, then Internet service providers, software companies, network
operators, and many others would be vicariously liable, and they
could do nothing about their liability.119 Such a result may have
seemed extreme to the Napster court, and this may explain why the
court modified the law to give relief to at least some technology pro-
viders.
The Napster opinion offers a good example of the problems that
presently beset the law of third party copyright liability. There is an
obvious and unresolved conflict between the generous interpretation
of contributory and vicarious liability from cases like Fonovisa and
the public policy concerns expressed in Sony. The Napster court
properly worried about the negative consequences of unrestrained
third party liability, and it also worried that an overly aggressive ap-
plication of Sony would leave too much room for the irresponsible
development of peer-to-peer technology. The court admirably tried to
strike a balance between these concerns, but it was hampered from
doing so effectively by the blunt and clumsy doctrinal formulation of
vicarious and contributory liability. This meant that the court could
18 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (describing elements of contributory li-
ability).
119 This outcome is softened somewhat by the so-called "notice and take-down" provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service
Provider Liability for Subscriber copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First
Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1882-84 (2000) for further analysis of the notice and take-down
provisions.
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not explain its admirable instincts without warping the logic of con-
tributory liability, altering vicarious liability beyond recognition, and
avoiding the cost-benefit analysis called for in Sony. The outcome of
the case may have been correct, but its logic was highly problematic.
B. Aimster
The case of In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, Appeal of: John
Deep'20 offers a more cogent, but still problematic, approach to the
third party copyright liability of peer-to-peer providers. The facts of
the case were similar to Napster in that the defendant, John Deep,
created a peer-to-peer network that was widely used to trade infring-
ing copies of recorded songs. Like Napster, Deep's Aimster service
required the user to download and install software that allowed the
user to log on to Aimster's central server.1 21 This server assisted us-
ers in their search for music files. A requesting user would type in the
name of a song she desired, and Aimster's server would identify other
Aimster users who had made the song available for downloading.
122
Once a suitable source for the desired song had been identified, the
requesting user could then send a request for a copy of the song to be
sent. 123
The Aimster service also offered three features that distinguished it
from Napster. First, Aimster automatically encrypted all communica-
tion between Aimster users, thereby making it impossible to know
exactly what files were being shared.1 24 Second, Aimster offered a
tutorial on its website about how to download music over the Aimster
system. This tutorial used examples based on the downloading of
copyright files.' 25 Third, Aimster operated Club Aimster, a fee-based
service that automatically listed and facilitated downloading of the
most popular songs. These songs were almost always copyrighted
material owned by the plaintiffs.1
26
The recording industry had the same objections to Aimster that it
did to Napster, and a number of those who held copyrights in popular
music sued. 127 The District court granted a preliminary injunction
against Aimster on grounds of vicarious and contributory infringe-
120334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
121 Id. at 646.
122 Id.
123 Id. The Seventh Circuit's opinion is not entirely clear about the operation of the Aim-
ster service. However, the Distrct Court opinion contains the necessary details. See In re Aim-
ster Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 642-43 (N.D. Il. 2002).
124 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646.
125 Id. at 651-52.
126Id.
127Id. at 645.
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ment. 128  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the injunction, but only on
grounds of contributory infringement. 12
9
The Aimster court tried to strike a compromise between extreme
interpretations of the law. The plaintiffs urged the court to adopt an
easily satisfied interpretation of actual knowledge that would hold a
technology provider liable if the provider knew that its service was
being used to infringe copyrights. 30  The court rejected this conten-
tion on the ground that it would expose too many potential defendants
to liability. 131  The court also rejected as extreme Deep's argument
that Sony prohibited liability against a technology or service provider
upon the mere possibility of a noninfringing use. 132  The court then
interpreted Sony as requiring a cost-benefit analysis of infringing and
noninfringing uses whenever a supplier offers a "product or service
that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses."' 133
The Seventh Circuit's analysis has much to commend it. The
court wisely rejected the extreme positions advocated by the parties in
favor a cost-benefit approach. Unfortunately, the rest of the Seventh
Circuit's analysis is disappointing because the court adopts a cost-
benefit analysis that ultimately overlooks Sony's fundamental insight
about the importance of substantial noninfringing uses.
The trouble starts with the defendant's claim that, under Napster,
he did not have constructive knowledge of infringement committed
by Aimster users. Deep apparently argued that Aimster's encryption
of user communication made it impossible for him to know exactly
128 Id. at 646.
12
9 Id. at 654 ("[W]e are less confident than the district judge was that the recording indus-
try would also be likely to prevail on the issue of vicarious infringement should the case be
tried, though we shall not have to resolve our doubts in order to decide the appeal.").
1301d. at 648 (stating that the test with respect to services "is merely whether the provider
knows it's being used to infringe copyright").
131 Id. at 649.
132 Id. at 649. The court wrote:
We also do not buy Aimster's argument that since the Supreme Court distinguished, in the
long passage from the Sony opinion that we quoted earlier, between actual and potential nonin-
fringing uses, all Aimster has to show in order to escape liability for contributory infringement
is that its file-sharing system could be used in noninfringing ways, which obviously it could be.
Were that the law, the seller of a product or service used solely to facilitate copyright infringe-
ment, though it was capable in principle of noninfringing uses, would be immune from liability
for contributory infringement. That would be an extreme result, and one not envisaged by the
Sony majority. Id. at 651.
133 Id. at 649. The court's use of the words "has infringing as well as noninfringing uses"
is a bit puzzling, given Sony's statement that the imputation of constructive knowledge to a
defendant is prohibited as long as the defendant's technology is "merely capable of substantial
noninfringing use." This implies that the noninfringing uses of a defendant's technology need
not be present ones. They could be potential future uses. The Seventh Circuit's language noted
here suggests that there must be present, actual noninfringing uses before Sony's cost-benefit
analysis can shield a defendant. If this suggested result were intended by the Seventh Circuit,
then this aspect of Aimster would appear inconsistent with Sony.
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what works were infringed. Of course, the Napster court stated that
Napster had enough knowledge to support contributory infringement
because it knew what works users traded over the Napster system.
Deep's lack of that knowledge therefore meant that he could not have
the necessary degree of knowledge.' 34 The court rejected Deep's ar-
gument as a transparent attempt to evade his responsibilities under
Napster135 According to the court, Deep knew that he was creating a
tool for copyright infringement, and he willfully avoided knowledge
of infringement to escape liability. This "willful blindness" was a
form of knowledge in copyright, but the court stopped short of hold-
ing that Deep's willful blindness alone established his contributory
liability, saying only that such blindness could not absolve Deep of
contributory liability. 136
Next, the court analyzed why it was proper to impute constructive
knowledge to Deep. In doing so, the court focused on Club Aimster
and the Aimster tutorials, noting that both focused solely on the
downloading of copyrighted files. The tutorials showed users only
how to swap copyrighted music owned by the plaintiffs, and Club
Aimster listed songs that were invariably copyrighted. 137  This
showed that Aimster wanted its users to infringe,1 8 but it did not lead
directly to the conclusion that Deep had actual or constructive knowl-
edge. Instead, it led the court to give Deep the burden of demonstrat-
ing that Aimster had substantial noninfringing uses,' 39 and it did so in
a manner inconsistent with Sony.
Sony clearly prohibited the imputation of constructive knowledge
when a defendant's technology was merely capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.14° However, the Aimster court forced Deep to
134 Id. at 650.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 650-51 (stating that "[o]ur point is only that a service provider that would other-
wise be a contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself
from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being used.").
137 Id. at 651-52. The court wrote:
In explaining how to use the Aimster software, the tutorial gives as its only examples
of file sharing the sharing of copyrighted music, including copyrighted music that the
recording industry had notified Aimster was being infringed by Aimster's users. The
tutorial is the invitation to infringement that the Supreme Court found was missing in
Sony. In addition, membership in Club Aimster enables the member for a fee of
$4.95 a month to download with a single click the music most often shared by Aim-
ster users, which tums out to be music copyrighted by the plaintiffs.
Id.
138 Id. at 651 ('The tutorial is the invitation to infringement that the Supreme Court found
was missing in Sony.").
139Id. at 652 (stating that evidence of willful blindness "is sufficient ... to shift the burden
of production to Aimster to demonstrate that its service has substantial noninfringing uses")
(emphasis added).
1401d. at 651-52.
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prove that Aimster had actual substantial noninfringing uses. The
court wrote:
It is not enough, as we have said, that a product or service be
physically capable, as it were, of a noninfringing use. Aimster
has failed to produce any evidence that its service has ever
been used for a noninfringing use, let alone evidence con-
cerning the frequency of such uses. 1
41
This led to the conclusion that the court did not have to balance Aim-
ster's relative social costs and benefits.142 Indeed, the court followed
this conclusion that even in cases where noninfringing uses had been
shown, the defendant still had to establish that it would be "dispropor-
tionately costly" for him to take any further measures to reduce in-
fringement. 1
43
The Seventh Circuit's analysis misses the point of Sony in two
ways. First, it allows liability against defendants whose technology is
merely capable of substantial noninfringing use. Deep lost because
he failed to show that Aimster had ever been used for a noninfringing
purpose. According to Sony, Deep should have been able to avoid
constructive knowledge by showing that Aimster was merely capable
of substantial noninfringing use.144
Second, the Seventh Circuit imposed a second cost-benefit analy-
sis in cases involving substantial infringing use that is also contrary to
Sony's logic about noninfringing uses. The court wrote:
Even when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet file-
sharing service, moreover, if the infringing uses are substan-
tial then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the pro-
vider of the service must show that it would have been dis-
proportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce
substantially the infringing uses.
14 5
The problem with this statement becomes apparent when one realizes
that an Internet file-sharing service, or any other technology for that
matter, can have both substantial actual or potential noninfringing
141 Id. at 653.
142 Id. ("Because Aimster failed to show that its service is ever used for any purpose other
than to infringe the plaintiffs' copyrights, the question ... of the net effect of Napster-like ser-
vices on the music industry's income is irrelevant to this case.").
1
4 3 
1d.
1
44 This does not mean that Deep should necessarily have been able to avoid liability, as he
could easily be held liable on a rationale borrowed from intentional torts. See infra note 173
and accompanying text.
145Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
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uses and substantial infringing uses. For example, a technology
might have its infringing and noninfringing uses evenly split. In
cases like this, Sony clearly and wisely prohibits an inference of con-
structive knowledge because the technology has substantial actual or
potential noninfringing uses. However, the Aimster court's analysis
permits that inference because it forces at least some defendants
whose technology has substantial noninfringing use to show that they
any further efforts to reduce infringement would have been "dispro-
portionately costly." Any defendant who failed would be exposed to
liability, contrary to Sony.
The conflicts between Aimster and Sony exemplify the problems
that arise because the law of third party copyright liability is too
clumsy to support a sophisticated analysis of the peer-to-peer puzzle.
The Aimster defendant Deep did two things that surely demonstrated
his culpability. First, he cynically tried to evade liability by using
encryption to eliminate a Napster type finding of actual knowledge.
Second, he implemented Club Aimster and the Aimster tutorials for
the specific purpose of helping people commit infringement. 146 Such
behavior is comparably blameworthy to that of the defendants in
Gershwin, where Columbia promoted concerts at which it knew its
artists gave unlicensed performances of music.
As a doctrinal matter, it was easy for the courts to hold the
Gerswhin defendant liable because Columbia actually knew exactly
what its artists were up to. By contrast, things were much harder for
the Aimster court. Deep may have been culpable, but he did not know
exactly what his users were doing because the Aimster encryption
scheme made it impossible to find out. Accordingly, liability on the
basis of actual knowledge was impossible, and this left constructive
knowledge as the only possible avenue to Deep's contributory liabil-
ity. The court might have been able to infer Deep's constructive
knowledge from his behavior, but Sony stood in the way. The Aim-
ster court therefore had to interpret its way around Sony, and in doing
so the court wound up ignoring Sony's wisdom. Things would have
been much easier for the court if the doctrine of contributory liability
had made it possible to hold Deep liable on account of his deliberate
behavior without regard to his knowledge. Unfortunately, the doc-
trinal elements of knowledge and material assistance did not allow
this, and the court's analysis paid the price.
The foregoing shows that Aimster cannot be considered a truly
successful integration of the various doctrines and policies of third
party copyright liability. The opinion improves upon Napster by rec-
146 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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ognizing the importance of a social cost-benefit analysis and by sug-
gesting a defendant's purposeful and cynical behavior ought to raise
his chances of liability. However, Aimster ultimately falls short in the
quality of its analysis because the clumsiness of existing doctrine
made it difficult, if not impossible, for the courts to properly account
for the defendants purposeful and cynical behavior. This led the court
to ignore the wisdom of Sony, and it creates the danger that courts
will incorrectly apply Sony in future cases.
C. Grokster
The third and most recent major peer-to-peer case is Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 47 In this case, the de-
fendants Grokster Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. freely distrib-
uted software that facilitated the sharing of computer files.148 Users
who downloaded and installed the software gained the ability to join
networks on which music and movie files could be swapped as on
Napster. However, there were two key distinctions between this case
and Napster and Aimster.
As an initial matter, the Grokster defendants introduced a great
deal of evidence about actual noninfringing uses for their systems. 149
This led the court to the conclusion that the systems were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. 150  Additionally, the Grokster and
StreamCast systems operated in a manner technically distinct from
Napster and Aimster. As noted earlier, Napster and Aimster used
central server systems to index lists of available files, and the users of
those systems had to communicate directly with the central servers to
find desired files.' 51 The Napster and Aimster defendants operated
these servers, so they had the ability to disconnect users who commit-
ted copyright infringement and block the swapping of copyrighted
files. By contrast, the Grokster and StreamCast networks operated
without central server systems. 52  Instead, computers operated by
network users performed the indexing function. Users of those net-
works therefore never communicated with servers operated by the
defendants, and the defendants therefore had no ability to disconnect
users or interfere with the swapping of copyrighted files.'53 This
147380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
1481d. at 1158.
149 1d. at 1161.
o
50 Id. (finding no material question of fact on the question of whether the defendants had
demonstrated the existence of substantial noninfringing uses).
1I See supra notes 99, 120-21 and accompanying text.
152 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1150-60.
53 d. at 1158-60, 1165 (describing operation of Grokster and StreamCast networks and
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technical distinction played a key role in the district court's partial
grant of summary judgment in the defendants' favor and the Ninth
Circuit's decision to affirm.
Consider first the Ninth Circuit's analysis of contributory in-
fringement. Here, as in Aimster and Napster, the principal challenge
was the integration of Sony with other cases that could easily be in-
terpreted to hold the defendants liable. The court chose to do this by
referring to the Napster court's attempt to distinguish between con-
structive and actual knowledge:
[I]n order to analyze the required element of knowledge of in-
fringement, we must first determine what level of knowledge
to require. If the product at issue is not capable of substantial
or commercially significant noninfringing uses, then the
copyright owner need only show that the defendant had con-
structive knowledge of the infringement. On the other hand,
if the product at issue is capable of substantial or commer-
cially significant noninfringing uses, then the copyright
owner must demonstrate that the defendant had reasonable
knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that
knowledge to prevent infringement.
1 54
This analytical framework gave the above referenced distinctions
great importance. According to the court, the demonstrated nonin-
fringing uses meant that the defendants could not be charged with
knowledge unless they had knowledge of specific infringing files.
155
Such knowledge might have seemed easy for the plaintiffs to estab-
lish because they had sent the defendants "thousands of notices"
about infringement.1 56 However, the Grokster court held that the de-
sign of the defendants systems rendered those notices irrelevant. 157
According to the court, the plaintiffs' notices imposed liability on
Napster because Napster used a centralized server system to maintain
an index of files that could be downloaded. The defendants could
have responded to the plaintiffs' notices by refusing to list files whose
names matched those of the plaintiffs' copyrighted songs, and the
defendants' failure to do so made them contributorily liable. By con-
the defendants' lack of control over user behavior).
54/Id. at 1161 (citing A & M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).
155 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162.
156In re Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036-37 (C.D. Cal 2003) (referring to "thousands
of notices" sent by plaintiffs to defendants); Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 (referring to notices sent
by plaintiffs to defendants).
157Id. at 1163.
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trast, the Grokster defendants used decentralized indexing systems
that did not rely on central servers operated by the defendants. This
meant that the defendants had no control over the listing of files and
could not respond to the plaintiffs' notices as Napster could have re-
sponded. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants' knowledge of
specific infringing files could establish liability only if the defendants
acquired that knowledge while they still had the opportunity to stop
the infringement from occurring. In this case, the technical design of
the defendants' system made it impossible for the defendants to stop
infringement from occurring, so contributory liability was impossi-
ble. 58 In fact, the court went on to hold that the defendants did not
even materially contribute to their users' infringement because it was
the users' computers that performed all of the indexing and commu-
nication related to the infringement. 1'5 9
The court's decision with respect to vicarious liability turned on a
similar analysis. The court cited Napster and Fonovisa for the propo-
sition that some degree of control over user behavior and the ability to
terminate access were strong evidence of the control necessary to
establish vicarious liability. However, the Grokster defendants had
no such control because their decentralized design made it impossible
for the defendants to either block user access or control user behavior.
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants could control user behavior
by altering the software already loaded onto users' computers, but the
court rejected the notion that copyright required the defendants to
tamper with the operation of computers they did not control. Accord-
ingly, the defendants were not vicariously liable.160
The Ninth Circuit concluded its analysis by dismissing the plain-
tiffs' final argument that the defendants should be held liable because
they turned a "blind eye" to their users' infringement. The Aimster
court had suggested that willful blindness would be a way to prove a
defendant's knowledge for purposes of contributory liability,' 6 1 but
581d. ("[E]ven if the Software Distributors 'closed their doors and deactivated all com-
puters within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no
interruption.").
159 Id. at 1163-64. The court wrote:
If the Software Distributors were true access providers, failure to disable that access after
acquiring specific knowledge of a user's infringement might be material contribution. Or,
if the Software Distributors stored files or indices, failure to delete the offending files or
offending index listings might be material contribution. However, the Software Distribu-
tors here are not access providers, and they do not provide file storage and index mainte-
nance. Rather, it is the users of the software who, by connecting to each other over the
internet, create the network and provide the access.
Id.
160Id. at 1165-66.
161 In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 642, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2001).
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the Napster court refused to follow along. According to the court,
"there is no separate 'blind eye' theory or element of vicarious liabil-
ity that exists independently of the traditional elements of liability.
Thus, this theory is subsumed into the Copyright Owners' claim for
vicarious copyright infringement and necessarily fails for the same
reasons." 
162
Grokster is perhaps the clearest of the three major opinions about
the third party copyright liability of peer-to-peer technology provid-
ers. It lacks Napster's transformation of vicarious liability into con-
tributory liability, it avoids Aimster's misapplication of Sony, and its
logic is easy to follow. At the same time, Grokster is also the most
puzzling opinion about third party copyright liability.
Grokster's puzzling aspects flow directly from its clear logic. The
defendants escaped liability because the design of their systems made
it impossible to control the behavior of their users. However, this
logic leads to an odd result. Third party copyright liability exists to
prevent the infringement of copyrighted works, but there are limits to
the reach of such liability because too much third party liability sup-
presses too much noninfringing behavior. The rationale behind third
party copyright liability implies that creators of peer-to-peer networks
are more likely to be held liable when their networks lead to the un-
checked infringement of copyrighted works, and less likely to be held
liable when their networks retain some ability to prevent infringe-
ment. Oddly enough, Grokster's logic leads to exactly the opposite
result.
According to the Ninth Circuit, defendants who retain some ability
to control their users stand a pretty good chance of being held liable
for their users' infringement. Indeed, this is precisely what happened
to Napster. The Grokster defendants had no such control over their
users, so they were not vicariously or contributorily liable. However,
this lack of control makes the peer-to-peer technology of Grokster far
more threatening to the security of copyright than then technology of
Napster or Aimster. As the Grokster court noted, there was nothing
the defendants could do about the infringement committed over their
networks. The defendants could go out of business and turn off all of
their computers, and infringement would continue unabated. 63 It
therefore makes little sense to excuse the Grokster defendants from
liability because such a decision appears to give future technology
providers every incentive to behave with complete disregard for the
security of copyright. Grokster indicates that creators of peer-to-peer
162 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1166.
163 Id. at 1163.
(Vol. 55:4
2005] SONY, TORT DOCTRINES, AND THE PUZZLE OF PEER-TO-PEER 849
networks who retain some control over network operations give them-
selves the duty of policing their networks. However, no liability ex-
ists when creators relinquish control over network operations. Ac-
cordingly, creators who want to avoid third party copyright liability
should design new networks with no safeguards against infringement.
This result is precisely the opposite of what ought to occur.
The odd result in Grokster offers yet another example of how ex-
isting doctrine fails to create an effective analysis of the peer-to-peer
puzzle. If system design is to affect liability, the relevant considera-
tions should include more than a system's control over infringement.
Peer-to-peer providers make numerous design decisions, and the par-
ticular circumstances and consequences of these decisions surely af-
fect the appropriateness of liability. For example, a defendant might
increase the risk of unchecked copyright infringement by selecting a
decentralized system architecture. If that design served no purpose
other than to increase the likelihood of unchecked infringement, then
holding the defendants liable would seem relatively sensible because
an alternately designed system could offer the same functionality with
less risk of infringement. By contrast, if the design increased the
functional utility of the system, liability would make less sense be-
cause the benefits of the design might be larger than the risk of in-
creased infringement.
From a public policy perspective, the Grokster court's inability to
grapple with the nuances of peer-to-peer system design is disappoint-
ing because it led to an odd result that might have been contrary to the
public interest. From a doctrinal point, however, the failure is per-
fectly understandable because there is little, if anything, about the
elements of vicarious or contributory infringement that would direct a
court towards an appropriate analysis. This shows, again, that the
doctrine needs to be reformed.
D. Taking Stock of Napster, Aimster, and Grokster
The foregoing description of Napster, Aimster, and Grokster
makes it possible to begin thinking about ways to improve the law of
third party copyright liability. Taken together, these cases show that
courts condition the liability of peer-to-peer providers on the design
of peer-to-peer systems and the motivation of those who create them.
The Ninth Circuit held Napster liable because the company did not
take advantage of its system's design to discourage infringement.
The Seventh Circuit held Deep liable in large part because Deep de-
signed and operated a peer-to-peer system for the express purpose of
facilitating infringement. Finally, the Ninth Circuit excused the
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Grokster defendants from liability because their systems did not offer
the defendants meaningful control.
The Napster, Aimster, and Grokster courts may not have gotten the
logic of their opinions perfectly straight, but their interest in system
design and designer's motivation make excellent sense because de-
sign and motivation affect the social utility of peer-to-peer systems
and the culpability of those who create them. The social utility of a
peer-to-peer system depends on the mix of its uses. Social utility
rises and falls with the prevalence of actual and potential noninfring-
ing uses. The case for third party copyright liability is therefore
weaker when the design of a peer-to-peer system supports noninfring-
ing uses while discouraging infringing ones, and stronger when the
system supports few noninfringing uses while supporting many in-
fringing ones. Motivation matters because there is a difference be-
tween designing a system for the express purpose of facilitating in-
fringement and designing a system for innocent reasons only to find
out that others misuse the system to commit infringement. Unfortu-
nately, the doctrine of third party copyright liability does not handle
these concerns well.
Consider first the doctrine of vicarious liability. Its elements of
control and financial interest measure the defendant's relationship
with the underlying infringer. As such, they are insensitive to a de-
fendant's motivation, but sensitive to the design of a defendant's net-
work because network design affects whether a defendant has control
over an infringer's behavior. However, as discussed earlier, the exist-
ing interpretation of vicarious liability responds to the design of a
network in a rather unusual way. Defendants who design systems
with some built-in control face a higher risk of liability than those
whose systems have no control, this encourages potential defendants
to increase, and not reduce, the likelihood of uncontrolled copyrightinfringement. 164
Contributory liability is similarly flawed, but in a more compli-
cated way. Its elements evaluate the culpability of a defendant who
provides assistance to an infringer. If defendants know enough about
the behavior of potential infringers and still choose to lend suffi-
ciently meaningful assistance, it is fair to hold them liable for the in-
fringement because they have become responsible for the infringe-
ment. However, the elements of knowledge and material assistance
do not adequately guide a court's consideration of motivation or de-
sign.
164 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
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Difficulties arise because a simple interpretation of knowledge is
insufficiently nuanced to define the kind of culpability that renders a
defendant liable for the infringement of another. For example, Sony
"knew" that its customers used VCRs to commit infringement, and it
chose to keep selling the technology anyway. A simple interpretation
of knowledge and material assistance would probably have led to
Sony's liability. However, the Supreme Court correctly understood
that variations in technical design greatly affected the wisdom of con-
tributory liability, particularly when the defendant's technology was
capable of substantial noninfringing use. The Court therefore added
nuance to the analysis of culpability by making the consideration of
technical design a prerequisite to any inference of knowledge in con-
tributory liability cases involving the distribution of technology. This
reasoning worked well in Sony, but the Napster, Aimster, and Grok-
ster courts have struggled to make it work in peer-to-peer cases.
First, the courts are not clear about whether technical design alone
can shield a defendant from the imputation of knowledge. Napster
and Grokster appear to support this proposition, but Aimster at least
suggests that the presence of substantial noninfringing uses cannot
shield a defendant from liability unless the defendant can "show that
it would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at
,,165 tecutleast reduce substantially the infringing uses. Second, the courts
are equally unclear about whether a defendant's purposefully irre-
sponsible behavior can overcome any protection offered by a peer-to-
peer system's substantial noninfringing uses. The Aimster court cer-
tainly suggested as much with its statement that "willful blindness" is
a form of knowledge. 166 However, the Grokster court unequivocally
rejected the plaintiffs' willful blindness argument, at least as it ap-
plied to vicarious liability.' 67 In short, the courts appear to understand
that a defendant's responsibility depends on what he did and why he
did it, but they have yet to articulate a framework that effectively ac-
counts for variations in design and motivation.
III. TORT LAW AND THIRD PARTY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
The foregoing has shown that the law of third party copyright li-
ability is not sufficiently nuanced to analyze peer-to-peer cases effec-
tively. Try as they might, the courts simply cannot make the relevant
doctrines properly account for important considerations like system
design and the motivation of defendants. Significant doctrinal reform
165 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
166See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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is required if the law is to cogently direct judicial attention and analy-
sis to issues that matter most.
This Article now applies concepts and doctrines from the common
law of tort to accomplish this reform. The approach makes a great
deal of intuitive sense. Vicarious and contributory copyright liability
are both descendants of tort doctrines,1 68 so the proposal made here is
not radical. Indeed, the point being made here is that the courts have
borrowed too little from tort law in the existing construction of third
party copyright liability.
The intuitions behind vicarious and contributory liability provide a
good starting point for the desired reconstruction. As noted earlier,
contributory liability measures the culpability of the defendant, and
vicarious liability measures the relationship between the defendant
and infringer without regard for the defendant's culpability. To put it
in slightly different tort-inspired terms, contributory liability is a form
of fault based liability, and vicarious liability is a form of strict liabil-
ity. This insight suggests that the law of third party copyright liability
could be improved by the application of fault based and strict liability
doctrines.
A. Fault and the Problems of Contributory Liability
Courts often hold tort defendants liable because they intended to
cause injury to the plaintiff or because they negligently failed to pro-
tect the plaintiff from the risk of injury. It is possible to analyze con-
tributory liability from both of these perspectives.
1. Contributory Copyright Liability as Intentional Tort
Consider first an intentional torts approach to contributory in-
fringement. A person who intentionally injures another is culpable in
a way that justifies liability. This reasoning implies that a defendant
who provides assistance to another with the intent of causing in-
fringement ought to be held liable should the infringement occur.
What then might it mean for a defendant to provide assistance with
the "intent" of causing infringement? Standard tort doctrine recog-
nizes two distinct methods for establishing a defendant's intent. A
defendant intends to cause a particular result when she acts with the
purpose of producing the result or knowing with substantial certainty
that the result will occur. 16 9 Both of these possibilities could easily
arise in contributory copyright liability cases.
168 See supra notes 21-22, 60 and accompanying text.
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8A (1965).
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The first branch of intent is fairly straightforward and evaluates the
result a defendant desires. It would apply to a defendant who creates
a peer-to-peer network hoping that others will use it to infringe. It
would not apply, however, to a defendant who creates a peer-to-peer
network hoping that others will use it for legitimate purposes, even if
she knows that some of the network's users will commit infringe-
ment. 70 Liability might be possible under the second branch of intent
or some other theory of liability, but such a defendant cannot be held
liable under the first branch of intent because she does not want in-
fringement to occur.
The second branch of intent is more complicated than the first be-
cause it requires a sophisticated understanding of a defendant's
knowledge. A defendant who acts with substantial certainty that her
actions will injure others arguably wants to cause the result. How-
ever, it is clear that only some types of substantial certainty justify the
imposition of intentional tort liability.
Many actors know that their behavior will cause injury to others in
a general way, but courts do not label them intentional tortfeasors.
Gun manufacturers know that someone will eventually suffer an un-
justified gunshot wound. Railroads know that passengers will some-
day be injured. Drug companies know that their medication will make
some people violently ill. All of these potential defendants know
with substantial certainty that their actions will lead to injury, but
their form of substantial certainty does not support intentional tort
liability for a number of reasons. First, the harm will occur in the
relatively distant future. Second, the defendant is not likely to know
the specific identity of the victim. Third, the behavior of other, poten-
tially more culpable individuals will often be involved in causing the
injury. Fourth, society may reap benefits from the defendant's behav-
ior that offset the losses to victims. All of these complications make
it unwise to impose liability simply because of what the defendant
knows. Courts therefore prefer to use concepts like negligence to
measure the liability of defendants who have generalized substantial
certainty about future injury because negligence explicitly accounts
for the specific circumstances of each case. This allows courts to
ensure that liability for injury gets assigned only to those who deserve
to be held responsible.
The knowledge of defendants who have general substantial cer-
tainty can be distinguished from the knowledge of other defendants
who have substantial certainty about relatively immediate injury to
specific victims. For example, consider an individual who pulls a
170 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
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chair out from under a person who is sitting171 or a hotel that rents
rooms to customers despite knowing that the entire building is horri-
bly infested with bedbugs. 72 In these cases, the complicating factors
referred to above are relatively absent. The victims are known, and
they will suffer injury soon. The involvement of other culpable indi-
viduals is unlikely, and it is hard to identify a socially useful reason
for the defendant's behavior. Accordingly, courts generally reserve
the second branch of intentional tort liability for defendants. who
know with substantial certainty that their behavior will cause rela-
tively immediate injury to identifiable victims without significant
intervention by others. 1
73
171 See Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
172 Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
173 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft), § 1, comment e:
The applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to situations in which
the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the conduct will bring about
harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small class of potential victims within
a localized area. The test loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential victims
becomes vaguer, and when in a related way the time frame involving the actor's conduct
expands and the causal sequence connecting conduct and harm becomes more complex.
Consider, for example, the company engaged in the mass production of products, which
are distributed to consumers nationwide. The company may well know that in light of the
inevitable limits of quality control, over time some number of its products will end up con-
taining manufacturing defects of the sort that will cause physical injuries. The company's
knowledge of the certainty of harm, at some undefined time and place, does provide an ar-
gument in favor of the company's liability. Yet that liability, when imposed, is understood
as a form of strict liability, not as liability for anything that can properly be regarded as an
intentional tort. Moreover, in many situations a defendant's knowledge of substantially
certain harms is entirely consistent with the absence of any liability in tort. For example,
an owner of land, arranging for the construction of a high-rise building, can confidently
predict that some number of workers will be seriously injured in the course of the con-
struction project; the company that runs a railroad can be sure that railroad operations will
over time result in a significant number of serious personal injuries; the manufacturer of
knives can easily predict that a certain number of persons using its knives will inadver-
tently cut themselves. Despite their knowledge, these actors do not intentionally cause the
injuries that result. Moreover, despite their knowledge, none of the companies-absent
further facts-can even be found guilty of negligence; nor does the knowledge possessed
by the knife manufacturer subject it to liability under products-liability doctrines.
See also Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 548 (D. Md. 1997)
(rejecting claim of battery by alleged victim of second hand smoke against tobacco company):
Similarly, Brown & Williamson does not manufacture, market, or distribute cigarettes for
the purpose of touching non-smokers with second-hand smoke. Furthermore, Brown &
Williamson did not know with a substantial degree of certainty that second-hand smoke
would touch any particular non-smoker. While it may have had knowledge that second-
hand smoke would reach some non-smokers, the Court finds that such generalized knowl-
edge is insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for battery. Indeed, as defendant
points out, a finding that Brown & Williamson has committed a battery by manufacturing
cigarettes would be tantamount to holding manufacturers of handguns liable in battery for
exposing third parties to gunfire. Such a finding would expose the courts to a flood of far-
fetched and nebulous litigation concerning the tort of battery. It is unsurprising that nei-
ther plaintiffs nor the Court have been able to unearth any case where a manufacturer of
cigarettes or handguns was found to have committed a battery against those allegedly in-
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The foregoing implies that it would be wrong to use the second
branch of intent to impose liability on providers of peer-to-peer tech-
nology simply because they know with substantial certainty that oth-
ers will use the technology to infringe. 174  Peer-to-peer technology
requires affirmative misuse before infringement occurs, and the iden-
tities of those who commit the misuse and the works they infringe are
unknown. Furthermore, the noninfringing uses of peer-to-peer tech-
nology may be sufficiently valuable to outweigh the social losses
caused by infringement. Accordingly, the link between the simple
provision of peer-to-peer technology and infringement is too attenu-
ated to justify a blanket rule of liability, and it makes more sense to
use negligence to determine whether liability in any particular case is
justified. 175
2. Contributory Copyright Liability as Negligence
The foregoing discussion of intentional tort principles suggests
that negligence principles can help clarify contributory copyright li-
ability. Most defendants will claim that they do not want infringe-
ment to occur, and that they developed or distributed copying tech-
nology for legitimate reasons. A court that accepts such a claim can-
not impose a blanket rule of liability from intentional tort, so it has to
inquire into the specific circumstances under which the defendant
acts. Negligence cogently directs the court's attention to relevant
considerations.
jured by its products.
174 If this were not the case, even the electric company would be held liable for infringe-
ment committed by its customers. After all, the electric company knows with substantial cer-
tainty that the sale of electricity will eventually facilitate copyright infringement. This kind of
knowledge with substantial certainty ought not to be enough.
175 It is at least theoretically possible to use the second branch of intent to impose liability
when providers of peer-to-peer technology have more specific certainty about the users of their
network and the prevalence of infringement. For example, a person might create a peer-to-peer
network for personal friends who he knows will use the network solely to commit infringement.
Our hypothetical creator might hope that infringement will not occur, and that they will some-
how miraculously decide to use the network for noninfringing purposes. In such a case, the link
between the provider's behavior and infringement may be close enough to justify intentional tort
liability. However, it makes more sense to avoid this theoretical possibility for two reasons.
First, such facts would be quite rare. A person who gives peer-to-peer to specific people whose
propensity to infringement is substantially certain will have great difficulty arguing that he
didn't want the infringement to occur. This means that the first branch of intent will often be
available to establish intentional tort liability. Second, the unavailability of second branch
liability does not mean that the defendant would escape. The provision of peer-to-peer technol-
ogy under these conditions would surely give rise to a strong claim of negligence. In short,
avoiding this theoretical possibility will not allow any defendants to escape liability without
justification, and it will keep the analysis of third party copyright liability from becoming un-
duly complex.
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According to standard doctrine, a defendant has the duty to behave
as a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances. A
defendant breaches this duty when he fails to take reasonable precau-
tions against foreseeable risks associated with his behavior. 176 A de-
fendant's behavior is unreasonable, and hence negligent, when it cre-
ates more risk than social utility.
177
Negligence is an effective way to analyze the contributory liability
of a defendant who creates or distributes peer-to-peer technology, but
not for the express purposes of causing infringement. As courts have
already recognized, peer-to-peer technology creates the certainty of
copyright infringement, but it also has noninfringing uses. Defen-
dants who distribute such technology for noninfringing purposes rea-
sonably foresee the risk of infringement associated with their behav-
ior. Liability therefore depends on whether the defendants took rea-
sonable precaution against the risk of infringement.
Contributory liability based on negligence works because it creates
an analytical framework that is flexible enough to handle a wide vari-
ety of cases. In some cases, plaintiffs will argue that it is unreason-
able to distribute any kind of peer-to-peer technology. Courts can use
negligence to analyze such claims by weighing the social value of
peer-to-peer technology against the infringement caused by such
technology. If a particular peer-to-peer system seems capable of
many noninfringing uses, its distribution is more likely to be reason-
able. In other cases, plaintiffs will contend that a particular form or
peer-to-peer technology is unreasonable, and that the defendant
should have designed its system with certain precautions against in-
fringement. Courts can use negligence to analyze these claims by
weighing the pros and cons of alternate designs for peer-to-peer sys-
tems.
For example, a plaintiff may claim that a defendant is negligent
because his peer-to-peer technology contains no method by which
users can be monitored and the transmission of files blocked. A court
could adjudicate such a claim by measuring the pros and cons of the
suggested monitoring and blocking precautions. On the one hand, the
precautions might or might not reduce a great deal of infringement.
1
7 6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 284(A) (1965) (describing negligent conduct
as "an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving an unreasonable
risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another"); Weinberg v. Dinger, 524 A.2d 366, 374
(N.J. 1987) ("The standard of care ordinarily imposed by negligence law is well established. To
act non-negligently is to take reasonable precautions to prevent the occurrence of foreseeable
harm to others.").
177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (stating that an act "is negligent if
the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or the
particular manner in which it is done").
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On the other hand, the precautions might impair the overall system's
utility by slowing its operation or reducing the types of files it could
transfer, and it might also be very costly to implement. It is of course,
impossible to anticipate the relative weight of these possibilities in
this Article. However, the discussion provided here shows that a neg-
ligence analysis gives the court an effective framework for handling
cases as they arise.
3. Improvements in the Law of Contributory Liability
The explicit application of fault principles to contributory copy-
right liability addresses some of the shortcomings of existing doctrine
as applied to peer-to-peer cases. This Article has already shown that
existing doctrine fails to account adequately for the facts that courts
seem most concerned about, namely the motivation of defendants and
the technical design of their systems. Additionally, courts have had
great difficulty integrating Sony's wisdom about potential noninfring-
ing uses with a convincing analysis of knowledge. The application of
fault principles allows courts to analyze a defendant's motivation and
the design of a peer-to-peer system while giving appropriate weight to
potential noninfringing uses as dictated by Sony.
As an initial matter, distinctions between intentional torts and neg-
ligence account for the different motivations of defendants. The most
culpable defendants are those who act for the purpose of causing in-
fringement. Intentional tort principles hold these defendants liable
with little regard for protestations about alternate uses for their tech-
nology. This makes sense because defendants who specifically want
to cause infringement cannot plausibly claim that they have inadver-
tently and innocently given assistance to someone who has deliber-
ately misused their technology. 1
78
Additionally, negligence gives courts an effective method for de-
termining whether the actual or potential noninfringing use of tech-
nology justifies its distribution and misuse for infringing purposes.
Defendants who successfully argue that they have created technology
for legitimate purposes are less culpable than those who want to cause
1
78 The proposal made here has obvious connections to the discussions about willful blind-
ness in Grokster and Aimster. In most cases, allegations of willful blindness lead to a negli-
gence analysis as long as the court believes that the defendant did not act for the purpose of
causing infringement. Accordingly, courts should ordinarily evaluate such a defendant's entire
behavior for its reasonableness under the circumstances. There may be, however, some cases in
which the defendant's willful blindness is evidence of a desire to cause infringement. This may
have been the case in Aimster, where Deep deliberately encrypted communications between
Aimster users in order to disclaim knowledge about infringement he hoped would occur. In
these cases, intentional tort liability becomes possible.
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infringement, and they ought not to be held liable unless particular
circumstances make their behavior unreasonable. Negligence helps
courts make the necessary determination by directing their attention
to the costs and benefits of peer-to-peer technology as well as the
many alternate designs or methods of distribution that become possi-
ble in the future.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the application of tort prin-
ciples effectively integrates Sony into the law of contributory copy-
right liability. Courts have struggled with Sony because its most ob-
vious interpretations lead to results that seem risky and extreme. On
the one hand, most peer-to-peer systems could be characterized as
capable of substantial noninfringing use. If courts did so, then Sony
could practically eliminate the possibility of contributory liability
against peer-to-peer providers. Such a result seems risky and extreme
because it protects even the most irresponsible and culpable defen-
dants from liability, and courts understandably want some method for
protecting copyright through responsible development and use of
peer-to-peer technology. On the other hand, courts could decide that
peer-to-peer systems are not capable of substantial noninfringing use.
This would impose liability on most, if not all, peer-to-peer providers.
This result would have the advantage of protecting copyrights, but it
would halt the development of peer-to-peer technology and deprive
society of benefits it would have otherwise enjoyed. This seems par-
ticularly risky and extreme because peer-to-peer technology is very
promising way of distributing information quickly and cheaply. Ac-
cordingly, courts shy away from condemning all forms of the tech-
nology, at least in part because it is impossible to forecast how the
technology will develop and the kinds of social benefits that will
emerge.
The use of tort principles creates a framework for contributory li-
ability that avoids extreme results. First, it imposes clear liability on
the most culpable and irresponsible developers of technology, namely
those who intentionally cause infringement. This result is fully con-
sistent with the holding of Sony because Sony affected only the impu-
tation of constructive knowledge. 179  The imposition of liability
against those who intentionally cause infringement does not rely on
constructive knowledge, so Sony need not be applied to intentional
tort cases.
180
179 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
180It is also worth noting that the Sony court noted that Sony had not "influenced or en-
couraged" unlawful copies. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
438 (1984).
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Second, tort principles allow courts to make fine distinctions be-
tween various forms of peer-to-peer technology and the circum-
stances of their distribution. Indeed, the application of negligence to
contributory liability incorporates a cost-benefit analysis that is con-
sistent with Sony's emphasis on actual and potential noninfringing
uses, but the results are not as extreme or inflexible. A finding for or
against one provider of peer-to-peer technology does not necessarily
lead to the same result in all other cases because negligence asks
courts to consider the specific circumstances of each case. Courts
who decide that a defendant is negligent are essentially deciding that
his particular technology and its distribution are not "capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing use" because the social benefits of the technol-
ogy do not outweigh its costs. Such decisions, however, do not pre-
clude findings in favor of other defendants whose technology is de-
signed or distributed differently. Courts can give room to defendants
who develop peer-to-peer technology responsibly while discouraging
those who behave unreasonably. Moreover, courts who follow a neg-
ligence analysis think about the very factors that are most important
to the future legality of technology. They will decide cases by paying
careful attention to the design of technology and the attendant costs
and benefits, including the value of actual and potential noninfringing
uses identified in Sony. This sort of analysis is precisely what society
should desire, and it is a significant improvement over the current
analysis that focuses solely on knowledge and contribution.
B. Strict Liability and the Problems of Vicarious Liability
There are two strict liability doctrines under which a peer-to-peer
provider might be held liable for the infringement of users: respon-
deat superior and strict products liability. At present, courts gener-
ally treat vicarious copyright liability as the greatly enlarged descen-
dant of respondeat superior.18 1 However, as this section will show, it
makes more sense to use strict products liability to analyze the vicari-
ous liability of providers of peer-to-peer technology.
1. Vicarious Copyright Liability and Respondeat Superior
The application of respondeat superior in copyright is nothing
new. Indeed, courts generally describe vicarious copyright liability as
an outgrowth of respondeat superior,182 and both vicarious copyright
181 See supra Section I.A. 1.
182See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022; Faulkner v. National Geo-
graphic Soc'y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The concept of vicarious copyright
liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an outgrowth of the agency principles of re-
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
liability and respondeat superior work by measuring the relationship
between the defendant and an underlying tortfeasor. However, a
careful application of respondeat superior limits third party copyright
liability to a relatively narrow range of defendants.
Respondeat superior holds employers liable for torts committed by
their employees within the scope of employment. The modem expla-
nation for this doctrine makes no mention of fault. Respondeat supe-
rior serves society's interests by encouraging defendants to take pre-
cautions against tortious behavior by others, provide compensation
for losses that do occur, and spread the costs of harm throughout soci-
ety.18
3
It is interesting and important to note that courts could use the
modem justification for respondeat superior to impose liability on a
far broader class of defendants than employers. Liability always en-
courages defendants to prevent or insure against loss. Courts have,
however, generally refused to extend respondeat superior to its logi-
cal limit because it seems either inefficient or unfair to extend liability
beyond situations in which defendants have a fairly close unity of
purpose and interest with underlying tortfeasors.' 84  Accordingly,
courts limit respondeat superior liability to cases in which some kind
of agency relationship exists between the defendant and the underly-
ing tortfeasor. These agency relationships include those of a tradi-
tional master and servant,185 a few independent contractor relation-
ships involving the nondelegable duties of principals, 86 and apparent
agents.
87
The traditional limits of respondeat superior suggest that courts
should hold defendants liable for infringement committed by their
employees with the scope of employment. They further suggest that
courts should be circumspect about imposing liability in cases that
spondeat superior.").
'
5 3 See Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1280 (N.Y. 1979) (identifying reasons for
respondeat superior as concern about employee produced injury, ensuring compensation, and
spreading loss); Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (stating that purpose of
respondeat superior is to internalize and spread loss).
184See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1293 (1997) (discussing efficiency and fairness explanations for limitation
of respondeat superior); Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer
Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL L. REV. 1739, 1749-64 (1996) (discussing fairness and efficiency
justifications for vicarious liability of employers).
18
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (establishing liability of master
for torts of servants committed within the scope of employment); see id. at § 220 (defining
"servant").
186 See id. at § 214 (holding master or other principal liable for tort committed by agent if
master or other principal confided performance of a nondelegable duty to agent).
187 See id. at § 265 (describing vicarious liability on the basis of apparent agency).
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involve independent contractors or apparent agents, and that liability
is inappropriate without the existence of some kind of principal-agent
relationship. Such reasoning, if adopted, would imply that most peer-
to-peer providers are not vicariously liable for infringement commit-
ted by their users on a respondeat superior theory.
2. Vicarious Liability, Abnormally Dangerous Activities, and Strict
Products Liability
The foregoing analysis implies that tort doctrine would not impose
strict liability on most providers of peer-to-peer technology simply
because of the relationship between providers and their users. How-
ever, this does not rule out the possibility of strict liability on some
other basis. Two possible causes of action come to mind. First,
courts might consider peer-to-peer file trading an abnormally danger-
ous activity. Second, courts could analyze peer-to-peer systems under
the framework used for design defect strict product liability cases.
The first of these possibilities seems initially attractive. After all,
peer-to-peer systems appear to create unusual risks of copyright in-
fringement, risks that might be comparable to those associated with
the manufacturing of dynamite or the generation of nuclear power.
The adoption of such an analogy might justify calling the provision or
maintenance of peer-to-peer systems an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity with the meaning of Restatement 2d of Torts §§519-520. How-
ever, there are important differences between peer-to-peer technology
and typical abnormally dangerous activities like dynamite blasting.
Courts impose strict liability on abnormally dangerous activities
because the risk of harm is great and cannot be eliminated by the ex-
ercise of due care. 188 Dynamite is risky, and it has the nasty habit of
being so unpredictable that injuries result despite reasonable precau-
tion. Accordingly, courts hold someone who stores dynamite strictly
liable for accidents that occur. 189 Peer-to-peer technology may be
comparable to storing dynamite because it creates a significant risk of
mass copyright infringement, but it is also different because the risks
of peer-to-peer technology are easily reduced with due care. Peer-to-
peer technology does not, by itself, cause infringement. Infringement
never occurs unless a person deliberately misuses the technology.
Accordingly, the creation or distribution of peer-to-peer is a plausible
18 8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965) (liability against those carrying
on abnormally dangerous activities); id. at § 520 (describing abnormally dangerous activities);
id. at § 520, cmt. H (ability to eliminate danger with due care is important in defining an abnor-
mally dangerous activity).
189 See id. at § 519, cmt. e (describing strict liability principles as applied against a person
storing dynamite in a city).
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but poor candidate for strict liability as an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity.
The second of these possibilities leads to a cogent and nuanced
method for adjudicating claims against peer-to-peer providers. Nu-
merous cases have held those who make or sell defectively designed
products liable for injuries proximately caused by those defects.190 As
the reader is undoubtedly aware, courts analyze design defect cases
by comparing the risks and benefits of the product's actual, allegedly
defective design with the risks and benefits associated with an alter-
nate, allegedly non-defective design. Products are considered defec-
tive "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product cou'ld
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alterna-
tive design ... and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe."'191
A defective design analysis encourages courts to develop the law
of third party copyright liability by studying the details of peer-to-
peer systems. A judge would first measure the infringement caused
by a peer-to-peer system and the social utility of the technology. This
measurement of the technology's social utility should include its ac-
tual and potential noninfringing uses. Next, the judge would identify
an alternate -design for the system. This would likely include the re-
moval of some or all of the system's peer-to-peer capabilities or the
addition of safeguards that would discourage the commission of in-
fringement. The judge would determine the cost and feasibility of
implementing the alternate design, the infringement prevented by the
alternate design, and any associated increase or decrease in the sys-
tem's overall utility. Finally, the judge would compare the alternately
designed system with the original system to determine whether, on
balance, the original system's design is unreasonable.
3. Improvements in the Law of Vicarious Liability
As with contributory liability, a tort-inspired approach to vicarious
copyright liability is superior to existing approaches because it directs
judicial attention to things that matter most. Existing doctrine condi-
tions liability on the existence of control and financial interest, and it
leads to a blunt analysis that does not incorporate the most important
policy concerns. Indeed, courts have already interpreted existing doc-
19OSee RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (describing
strict products liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (describing strict
products liability); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (1998); id. at § 2, Reporter's Note, cmt. d (1998)
(discussing numerous opinions applying risk-benefit analysis in strict product liability cases).
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trine to deny liability against providers of the peer-to-peer technology
most likely to cause unrestrained copyright infringement while im-
posing liability on providers of technology that is less risky.' 92 Exist-
ing doctrine's inability to account for the relative costs and benefits of
peer-to-peer technology is undesirable because it raises the risk that
courts will reach socially undesirable results.
By contrast, a tort-inspired approach to vicarious liability drawsjudicial attention to the actual and potential costs and benefits of
peer-to-peer technology. It only imposes liability without regard to
these costs and benefits when the underlying infringer is an agent of
the technology provider. In all other cases, it encourages courts to
analyze the merits of specific peer-to-peer systems in a careful, sensi-
tive way. Courts will therefore probably avoid imposing liability on
all providers of peer-to-peer technology. To be sure, peer-to-peer
systems create the risk of significant copyright infringement, but they
also create the promise of inexpensive and rapid distribution of in-
formation. Courts that pay heed to the enormous social benefits made
possible by video recorders, photocopy machines, televisions, radios,
tape recorders, and other technologies will rightly refrain from declar-
ing all peer-to-peer systems illegal even though their distribution en-
ables infringement. Instead, they will scrutinize peer-to-peer systems
on a case by case basis to identify designs that are, on the whole, un-
reasonable. As was the case with negligence, such a determination
can and should included consideration of a systems actual and poten-
tial noninfringing uses. This will draw judicial attention to important
questions of system design and construction.
For example, courts may find themselves deciding whether decen-
tralized peer-to-peer systems are unreasonable. Systems like Grokster
have the advantage of being reliable and cost-effective because no
single entity must bear the expense of maintaining essential equip-
ment of the sort used by Napster. However, these advantages may
also come at the expense of a fairly complete inability to monitor or
defeat infringement. Courts will have to decide whether these design
tradeoffs are reasonable. Courts may also find themselves consider-
ing the relative merits of smaller design issues like limits on the num-
ber of users for a given peer-to-peer system, default settings that
make it harder for users to infringe, or the existence of operating in-
structions or warnings that discourage users from infringement. All
19 2 The point being made here is not that Grokster was wrongly decided. That is obviously
a question the Supreme Court will soon decide. The Article is simply pointing out that neither
Napster nor Grokster really analyzes the costs and benefits of the systems under consideration,
including specific design choices. That is why the opinions in those cases seem rather unsatis-
fying. They simply do not address the things that matter most.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
of these possibilities and others presently unimagined may reduce the
likelihood of infringement without unreasonably costing society the
benefits of peer-to-peer technology. 
193
It does not take long to see why the analysis suggested here is su-
perior to one derived from existing doctrine. The third party copy-
right liability of peer-to-peer providers is controversial, and the stakes
are high. Society has much to gain from the careful, well-reasoned
development of law. In situations like this, it is particularly danger-
ous for courts to issue broad, blanket pronouncements that foreclose
the case-by-case refinement of law. Unfortunately, existing doctrine
threatens this result because it bluntly draws judicial attention away
from the careful analysis of peer-to-peer technology. By contrast, the
tort-inspired approach suggested here encourages courts to apply
relevant policy to the merits of each case. This approach will, over
time, result in the kind of careful construction of law that benefits
society most.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that a tort-inspired approach to third
party copyright liability can help courts solve the peer-to-peer puzzle.
The third party copyright liability of peer-to-peer providers is contro-
versial, and the stakes are high. In situations like this, it is particu-
larly dangerous for courts to issue broad, blanket pronouncements
that foreclose the case-by-case refinement of law. Unfortunately,
existing doctrine hampers development of the law because it bluntly
draws judicial attention away from the careful analysis of peer-to-peer
technology. By contrast, the tort-inspired approach suggested here
encourages courts to apply relevant policy to the merits of each
case.
194
193 One possible objection to the analysis suggested here is that certainty will be impossi-
ble. This might be undesirable because risk-averse technology providers may leave the market
for peer-to-peer technology without greater assurances against liability. There are two re-
sponses to this objection. First, the alternative possibilities are not likely to have more certainty.
Granted, certainty could be achieved if courts decided that any possible noninfringing use pro-
tects a technology provider from liability. However, this position is so extreme that its adoption
is unlikely. Any attempt at compromise will involve some kind of fact-specific, case by case
analysis. At least the proposal made here contains a relatively clear method of analysis which
gives peer-to-peer providers the opportunity to make a reasonable estimate of their exposure to
liability. Second, technology providers routinely face similar uncertainty in tort law. No manu-
facturer can be sure that its design will be found reasonable, but this has not stopped manufac-
turers from designing new technologies, making them reasonably safe under the circumstances,
and profitably marketing them.
194 The changes suggested here raise the question of how a tort-inspired approach might af-
fect third party copyright liability more generally. Full consideration of this is beyond the scope
of this Article, but a preliminary analysis indicates that a tort-inspired approach would narrow
the scope of vicarious liability while leaving contributory liability relatively unchanged. How-
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It is, of course, never easy to make the kind of doctrinal changes
suggested here. Existing doctrine becomes well-entrenched through
habit and weight of stare decisis. However, it is particularly impor-
tant to make the necessary effort now because the peer-to-peer puzzle
is only one of many sources of pressure on the law. Plaintiffs have
recently claimed that Napster's investors are liable for the infringe-
ment of Napster users,19 that Internet search engines are liable for
infringement on websites,196 that credit card companies are liable for
doing business with infringers,197 and that the makers of digital video
recorders like ReplayTV and TiVo are liable for infringement. 198
These claims may or may not prove successful, but their very asser-
tion demonstrates the increasing likelihood of novel third party copy-
right suits for which the existing structure of existing doctrine will be
insufficient. Failure to begin improving the law of third party copy-
right liability allows existing doctrine to continue leading judicial
attention away from the factors that matter most in third party copy-
right liability, and this increases the likelihood of decisions that do
not serve society's interest. Hopefully, this Article will contribute to
a dialog that results in constructive change.
ever, relatively few results would change because many vicarious liability cases also make sense
as contributory liability cases. It is therefore the author's present belief that the proposals made
by this Article can be implemented without upsetting widely accepted results.
195 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
196 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybemet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
197 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Inter. Svc. Ass'n., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1914 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
198 See Paramount Pictures Corporation v. RePIayTV, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (C.D. Cal.
2004).

